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UNITED STATES DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS OF 
FOUR STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MINERALS: 
IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
G. Kevin Jones* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
[O]ur survival as a leading nation depends on our mineral sup-
plies. The close relation between minerals and our national se-
curity is too apparent to require detailed explanation. 
Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's 
Land, A Report to the President and to the Congress 121 (1970). 
The United States is dependent upon the import of many nonfuel 
minerals! that are essential to its national security and economy. 2 
* B.S. 1974, Brigham Young University; J.D. 1977, J. Reuben Clark School of Law, Brigham 
Young University; L.L.M. Energy Law, 1984, University of Utah. Member, Utah State Bar. 
Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior. 
This Article expresses the author's personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the 
opinions, policies, or positions of the Department of the Interior or its offices. The Editorial 
Board of the Environmental Affairs Law Review would be pleased to receive a response to 
this Article. 
1 The term nonfuel minerals means all raw materials of mineral origin with the exclusion of 
food and of energy fuels such as petroleum, gas, and solid fuels. 30 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(1982); 
Exec. Order No. 10,529, 19 Fed. Reg. 2397 (1954); Exec. Order No. 11,490, 34 Fed. Reg. 
17,567 (1969). 
2 S. REP. No. 897, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted at 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4871,4872 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 897]. 
Minerals are so fundamental to a civilization that mankind's technological progress is cate-
gorized according to man's developing ability to use minerals effectively. Mankind has ad-
vanced from the Stone Age, through the Bronze Age, Iron Age, Coal Age and the Petroleum 
Era. The Bronze Age began when man "mastered certain elementary metallurgical techniques. 
The [economic] revolution that accompanied this event signified more inventions and discov-
eries than in any period of human history until the sixteenth century." Viljoen, Minerals 
From the Dawn of Mankind to the Twenty-First Century, 79 J.S. AFRICAN INST. MINING & 
METALLURGY 410, 410 (1979). 
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The United States is dependent upon foreign sources of supply for 
more than fifty percent of twenty-four out of thirty-two strategic 
minerals. 3 Furthermore, United States dependence upon foreign 
sources of supply will increase as strategic minerals become increas-
ingly important in meeting the demands of new technology in the 
energy industry,4 in making the nation's steel industries competitive 
internationally,5 and in research programs for the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (Star Wars).6 
Of the minerals upon which the United States is dependent for 
foreign sources of supply, chromium, cobalt, manganese, and plati-
num group metals are the most critical. 7 These metals are the "me-
tallurgical Achilles' heel"8 of United States strategic mineral supply 
because their role in the economy is pervasive and because they are 
For discussions on nonfuel minerals and the United States, see generally THE MINERAL 
POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1975-2000 (E. Cameron ed. 1973); J. TILTON, THE FUTURE 
OF NONFUEL MINERALS (1977); A Symposium on Primary Resource Scarcity Effects on 
Trade and Investment, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 1087 (1975); Symposium, World Mineral Resources: 
Development, Trade, Outlook, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157 (1978). ' 
3 The U,S, Stake in the Global Economy: Hearings on the Implications for the United 
States of the Accumulation of External Debt by Developing Countries Before the Subcomm, 
on International Economic Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm" 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings on U,S, Stake in Global Econ,] (statement of Rep. James 
D. Santini, Nev.). See also Sheets, America's Gap in Strategic Minerals, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1982, at 59. 
The United States imports more than 40% of its supply for 34 of the 90 known mineral 
materials and is more than 90% dependent upon foreign sources for 16 mineral commodities. 
The National Critical Materials Act of 1984: Hearings Before the Subcomm, on Transpor-
tation, Aviation and Materials of the House Comm, on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 170 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on Nat'l Critical Materials Act] (statement of 
Robert Dale Wilson, Director, Office of Strategic Resources, United States Department of 
Commerce). 
4 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIC MATERIALS: TECHNOLOGIES TO 
REDUCE U.S, IMPORT VULNERABILITY 77-78 (May 1985) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGIES TO 
REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY]; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS, MINERALS CRITICAL TO DEVELOPING FUTURE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, THEIR 
AVAILABILITY, AND PROJECTED DEMAND (June 25, 1984); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, LEARNING TO LOOK AHEAD: THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL 
MATERIALS POLICY AND PLANNING PROCESS 36-37 [hereinafter LEARNING TO LOOK AHEAD] 
(Apr. 19, 1979) [hereinafter NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING], 
5 Hearings on Nat'l Critical Materials Act, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Rep, George 
E. Brown, Jr., Cal.). The development of new technologies to revitalize the Nation's depressed 
steel industries would cost approximately $1 billion. I d. 
61d. at 2. 
7 Holden, Getting Seriou,s About Strategic Minerals, SCIENCE, Apr. 17, 1981, at 305. 
8 Meyer, How We're Fixed for Strategic Minerals, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 1981, at 68. See also 
Foreign Metals-An Achilles' Heel for U,S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 19,1985, at 
74 [hereinafter Foreign Metals]. 
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vulnerable to supply interruption. 9 Three nations, South Africa, 
Zaire, and the Soviet Union, produce over half of the world's chro-
mium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum group metals. 10 These met-
als are essential to the industrial production of the United States. ll 
They are used in manufacturing high-temperature alloys, steel, au-
tomotive catalysts, electronics, aircraft engines, modern weapons, 
telecommunications, as well as oil refining and chemical processing. 12 
With limited exceptions, the United States has no domestic com-
mercial production of chromium, cobalt, manganese, or platinum 
group metals and thus an alternate supply of the four metals is not 
readily available. 13 The federal government maintains a national de-
fense stockpile, but the stockpile materials are available for national 
security purposes only.14 Furthermore, the stockpile contains re-
serves "far below what they should be today and far below what our 
national policy originally conceived as necessary. "15 As a result, the 
United States is increasingly dependent on foreign sources of stra-
tegic materials and is vulnerable to a variety of supply interrup-
tions. 16 Former Congressman James Santini has warned about the 
potentially dangerous effects to the United States economy and 
national security resulting from a minerals supply interruption. 17 
This Article examines the importance of nonfuel minerals to the 
United States and its increasing dependence on foreign sources of 
mineral supplies. Chromium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum group 
metals are the primary minerals discussed. The Article also identifies 
governmental actions that have impeded the onshore mining indus-
try and considers past minerals policy. Other issues that this Article 
9 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 11. 
10 Id. at 3. 
11 Id. See also 30 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(I) (Supp. III 1985). 
12 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 3; Foreign 
Metals, supra note 8, at 74; America's Gap in Strategic Minerals, supra note 3, at 59. 
1:3 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 3. 
14Id. 
15 Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mines and 
Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affain, Part III, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
9 (1980) [hereinafter Norifuel Minerals Policy Review, Part III] (statement of General Al-
exander M. Haig, Jr., President and Chief Operating Officer, United Technologies Corp.). 
16 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 3; 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
17 According to Mr. Santini, "[ w ]ithout a continued supply of mineral imports, our entire 
industrial base would be shattered and our defense capability would be crippled." Hearings 
on U.S. Stake in Global Economy, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Rep. James D. Santini, 
Nev.). 
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examines include factors that affect United States security of mineral 
supply and recommended approaches to reduce United States import 
dependency upon foreign mineral supply sources. 
II. THE ROLE OF NONFUEL MINERALS IN THE UNITED STATES 
ECONOMY 
A. The Current United States Posture on Nonfuel Minerals 
An adequate nonfuel minerals supply is essential to the economies 
of the United States and other industrialized nations. 18 The American 
standard of living is dependent upon nonfuel minerals. 19 Currently, 
the United States economy requires four billion tons of new mineral 
supplies annually, or about 41,000 pounds per person. 20 With six 
percent of the world's population, the United States consumes about 
thirty percent of the world's mineral production. 21 Indeed, the 
United States has consumed more minerals during the past thirty 
years than in the total history of man to date. 22 
18 HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. 
ON ECON. STABILIZATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., A CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK ON U.S. 
MATERIALS IMPORT DEPENDENCylVULNERABILITY 2 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter 
CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK]. See also 30 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(I) (1982); 30 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(I) 
(Supp. III 1985). 
The economies of all developed countries are heavily dependent upon nonfuel minerals. 
Every $10 million worth of nonfuel minerals injected into an economy generates about $250 
million worth of total economic activity. For certain industries the multiplier effect is even 
greater. For illustration, $4 billion worth of petrochemicals contributes to approximately $430 
billion worth of industrial products. CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra 18, at 2. The value 
of materials produced annually in the United States from nonfuel minerals is approximately 
$200 billion. Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Part I, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 29 (1979) [hereinafter Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review, Part I]. 
19 STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON MINES AND MINING OF THE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND 
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY: 
NATIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter U.S. MINERALS VUL-
NERABILITY REPORT]. The dependency of America's industrial society is illustrated by the 
fact that a color television set contains about 35 different mineral commodities, and that a 
telephone contains about 40. Id. at 5. 
20 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 3, 76. This annual requirement of raw 
materials reflects the industrialization of the United States economy. 
At the time of the Revolutionary War the annual per capita consumption of minerals 
in the colonies is estimated to have been around 1,200 pounds, of which 1,000 pounds 
were sand and gravel; 112 pounds brick and lime; 40 pounds coal; 20 pounds iron; 
and the balance copper, glass, lead, potash, salt, nitrates, sulfur, and zinc. 
Id. at 76. 
21Id. at 3. 
22 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS POLICY NEEDS BETTER COORDINATION AND Focus 2 
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The high consumption of the world's raw materials, particularly 
by the United States, Europe, and Japan,23 has led to concern about 
possible exhaustion of the world's mineral reserves.24 Commentators 
have predicted an end to the affluence25 and growth patterns26 that 
characterize our modern society. These studies forecast the immi-
nent depletion of the world's raw materials,27 suggesting that the 
(1984) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS POLICY). 
See also MacGregor, International Mineral Development, 17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 205 
(1972); CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 3. 
The high United States consumption of the world's raw materials, disproportionate to its 
population, has been criticized by developing states of the Third World as inequitable and has 
been questioned by commentators at home as unfair to future generations. For discussions 
on the ethical concerns and justifications of the high consumption rates of nonfuel minerals in 
industrialized countries, see Williams, Running Out: The Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 181-85 (1978); Note, Norifuel Mineral Cartels-United States Eco-
nomic Policy and Changing World Resource Patterns, 7 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 863, 874-83 
(1975). 
23 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 3. 
24 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2169(b)(3) (1982); H. BARNETT & C. MORSE, SCARCITY AND 
GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE AVAILABILITY (1963); P. CONNELY & R. 
PERLMAN, THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS (1975); THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE DEPLETION (D. Pearce ed. 1975); D. 
NOVICK, A WORLD OF SCARCITIES (1976); Ragsdale, Ecology, Growth and. Law, 16 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 214, 240-50 (1980). 
25 See, e.g., P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, THE END OF AFFLUENCE (1974). One commentator 
has written that the United States has entered an era of diminishing expectations, and this 
has produced a profound effect on the national psyche. 
We are launched on the early stages of the process of diminishing expectations. It 
is a painful process, a response to deep loss, a feeling akin to a form of grief .... 
Our expectations of "more" have been ravaged. We are just beginning to face the 
prospect of "less." We don't know what it means. We don't know how bad it is going 
to be. And deep down in our hearts, we don't believe it. Or perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that we don't know quite what to believe. 
Yankelovich, Reagan and National Psyche, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1982, at 5, 6. 
26 See, e.g., D. MEADOWS, D. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO 
GROWTH: A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND 
(1972). 
27 Table I, on which the preservationist school bases its argument, suggests that the deple-
tion of the world's raw material resources is imminent. See also Heilbroner, Growth and 
Survival, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 139, 141 (1972). 
However, some prominent scholars differ with the "limits to growth" advocates and maintain 
that the world is not running out of raw materials. The technological inventory of the earth's 
resources is incomplete, and, therefore, we do not know the extent of resources that can 
ultimately be recovered from the earth. In addition, as illustrated in Table 2, world resources 
have increased over the 20 year period from 1950 to 1970 as demand has increased. Simon, 
The Scarcity of Raw Materials: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, ATLANTIC, June 
1981, at 33. For further discussion differing with the limits-to-growth advocates, see Heil-
broner, supra; Mason, Resources in the Past and for the Future, in RESOURCES FOR AN 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE 13-17 (C. Hitch ed. 1978); Perlman, Is the World Running Out of Raw 
Materials?, 50 INT'L AFF. 416 (1974). 
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growing demand for natural resources, heightened by increased pop-
ulation pressure,28 will produce devastating international effects. 29 
The claim by "limits to growth" theorists that the industrialized 
world was in transition from an era of abundant raw material sup-
plies to a period of scarcity has been criticized. 30 Nevertheless, there 
28 See The U.S. Stake in the Global Economy: Hearings on the Implications for the United 
States of Trends and Interrelationships Between Population and Development in Developing 
Countries Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (statement of Rep. James H. Scheuer, N.Y.). 
Ninety percent of the population growth between now and the year 2000 will take place in 
the developing countries of the Third World. It will give these countries a cumulative job 
deficit by the year 2000 of over one billion jobs. It is impossible to produce one billion jobs in 
the developing world by the end of the century. Therefore, the staggering population increase 
will have severe international implications for the United States, especially in terms of illegal 
immigration. Id. In the next decade the United States must look forward to the prospect of 
instability on its southern border with Mexico. See Broyles, The Key is Mexico, not Nicaragua, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 31, 1986, at 10; Castaneda, Mexico's Coming Challenges, 
64 FOREIGN POL'y 120 (Fall 1986); Cusack, Defusing Mexico's Population Bomb, SCHOLASTIC 
UPDATE, Feb. 21, 1986, at 118; Levy & Szekely, Mexico: Challenges and Responses, 85 
CURRENT HISTORY 16 (Jan. 1986). 
29 One of the more extensive reports on the global condition is The Global 2000 Report: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economics of the Congressional Joint Eco-
nomic Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980) [hereinafter Global 2000 Report] (statement of 
Gus Speth, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality). The Global 2000 Report is the 
result of an intense and wideranging government effort to examine the long-term implications 
of present global population, natural resource, and environmental trends. The major findings 
of the Global 2000 Report are highlighted in the first two paragraphs of the report: 
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, 
less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in 
now. Serious stresses involving popUlation, resources, and environment are clearly 
visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the world's people will be poorer in 
many ways than they are today. 
For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for food and other 
necessities of life will be not better. For many it will be worse. Barring revolutionary 
advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 
than it is now-unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends. 
Id. For further discussion on the Global 2000 Report, see Speth, The Global 2000 Report to 
the President, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 695 (1980). 
For an interesting point, counterpoint on the Global 2000 Report, see Simon, Global Con-
fusion, 1980: A Hard Look at the Global 2000 Report, 62 PUB. INTEREST 3 (Winter 1981); 
Gillman, Julian Simon's Cracked Crystal Ball, 65 PUB. INTEREST 71 (Fall 1981); Simon, 
False Bad News Is Truly Bad News, 65 PUB. INTEREST 80 (Fall 1981). 
30 Murphy, A Report on the Potential for Supply Dislocation of Selected Nonenergy Mate-
rials, in SPECIAL STUDY ON ECONOMIC CHANGE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. ENERGY AND MA-
TERIAL: A SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES OR COMMITMENT? 185, 186 (Comm. Print 1980). See 
also Goeller & Zucker, Infinite Resources: The Ultimate Strategy, 223 SCI. 456 (Feb. 3, 1984). 
Goeller and Zucker believe that the world contains plentiful nonfuel minerals that can supply 
mankind's long-term needs at reasonable cost and with acceptable environmental consequences 
provided there are "stable political conditions, ... continuing availability of capital, and, most 
importantly, vigorous and successful research in the field of materials." Goeller & Zucker, 
supra, at 456. 
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have been important changes in world raw material markets that 
have affected United States interests. 31 The United States faces 
increased competition for nonfuel minerals from developing and 
other industrialized countries as their economies grow and standards 
of living rise. 32 Compounding the problem, easily found mineral de-
posits are being depleted, ore grades are declining, and mining costs 
are increasing. 33 As a result, the United States has become increas-
ingly dependent upon foreign supplies for basic nonfuel mineral 
needs34 and consequently has an annual trade deficit of one billion 
dollars in basic raw materials. 35 
B. Strategic and Critical Minerals and Materials 
There are four major factors that make a mineral a strategic 
resource: (1) the critical need for the mineral in defense or industry 
such that a prolonged interruption would result in catastrophic con-
sequences; (2) the lack of adequate domestic resources; (3) the limited 
potential for developing substitutes; and (4) the lack of alternative 
or more secure sources of supply. 36 
31 Murphy, supra note 30, at 186. 
32 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 28. While United States consumption of 
nonfuel minerals is increasing in absolute terms, the percent of consumption has declined form 
60% in 1950 to less than 30% in 1981 of the world total. [d. 
33 [d. at 24. See H.R. REP. No. 1442, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted at 1970 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5792, 5793 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1442]; see also The Death of 
Mining, Bus. WK., Dec. 17, 1984, at 64,65,67. 
34 50 U.S.C. app. § 2169(b)(1) (1982). 
35 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 14; Clark & Field, How Critical are 
Critical Materials?, 88 TECH. REV. 38 (Aug.lSept. 1985). 
36 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 129, 344-49. 
There is no universally accepted definition of the term "strategic and critical materials." It 
depends upon the purpose of the definition. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VUL-
NERABILITY, supra note 4, at 45. For purposes of a national materials stockpile, the term 
"strategic and critical materials" is defined in the context of a hypothetical cut off of foreign 
mineral supplies during a three year national emergency. 50 U.S.C. § 98a(b), 98b(b)(a)(2) 
(1982). The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Revision Act of 1979,50 U.S.C. §§ 98-
100a (1982), defines the term "strategic and critical materials" as "materials that (A) would 
be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States 
during a national emergency, and (B) are not found or produced in the United States in 
sufficient quantities to meet such need." 50 U.S.C. § 98h-3(1) (1982). 
For the purpose of this study the term "strategic" refers to the likelihood that the future 
supply of a particular mineral to the United States may be interrupted, while "critical" refers 
to the importance of the mineral to the United States economy. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROMOTE A 
STABLE SUPPLY OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS 5-6 (June 3,1982) 
[hereinafter ACTIONS TO PROMOTE A STABLE SUPPLY OF MINERALS]. Thus, a strategic 
material may be briefly defined as "one for which the quantity required for essential civilian 
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Table 3 lists twelve minerals and materials that are essential to 
the United States economy and whose supply is relatively limited 
and vulnerable to interruption. The table also lists major foreign 
sources, mineral usage, and United States import reliance as a per-
cent of apparent consumption. While all of the minerals listed in 
Table 3 are considered essential to the domestic economy and na-
tional security, four of them~hromium, cobalt, manganese, and 
platinum-have been referred to as "first tier" strategic materials 
because of their widespread role and vulnerability to supply disrup-
tions. 37 The remaining eight, while all essential to the United States 
economy, form a second tier of strategic materials because of their 
more limited roles. 38 Table 4 shows the 1980 distribution of con-
sumption of the four first tier minerals over the major industrial 
sectors in the United States. 
1. Chromium 
Chromium has a variety of applications throughout the United 
States economy,39 the most essential of which are superalloys,40 
stainless steel, and as an alloying element in tool, spring, and bearing 
steels. 41 There is no known substitute for chromium in stainless 
and military uses exceeds the reasonably secure domestic and foreign supplies, and for which 
acceptable substitutes are not available within a reasonable period of time." TECHNOLOGIES 
TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 11. 
37 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 11. 
38 Id. 
39 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 135. 
40 Chromium is combined with nickel, cobalt, aluminum, and titanium to give superalloys 
corrosion and oxidation resistance at high temperatures and stress. Alloy steels would fail 
under these conditions because of creep, defined as the "gradual deformation of a material 
when it is subjected to stress at high temperature," or to rapid corrosion by the hot exhaust 
gases of a jet engine. These materials therefore are essential to the construction of gas turbine 
engines. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 12-13, 
63. "The manufacture of superalloys accounts for a majority of the total domestic consumption 
of chromium metal. In 1981, consumption of metallic chromium in superalloys was 2,500 short 
tons or 64 percent of the total domestic consumption of chromium metal." I d. at 63. 
41 Foreign Metals, supra note 8, at 74; TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNER-
ABILITY, supra note 4, at 12, 65. As an alloying element, chromium increases hardness and 
impact strength of steel and provides resistance to oxidation, corrosion, and wear. CONGRES-
SIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 135. As an important ingredient in stainless steel and 
super alloys, chromium is essential in chemical processing applications, oil and gas production 
and refining, power generation, jet engines, and in automobile exhaust systems, principally 
in the catalytic conversion. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra 
note 4, at 63-66. Chromium in its mineral form of chromite is used in making refractory bricks 
to line furnaces, steam generators, fireboxes, and ladles for molten steel. Id. In a chemical 
form it is used in pigments, metal treatments, and leather tanning. 
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steels and high temperature resistant superalloys.42 Therefore, it is 
most essential to modern industrial needs. 43 
The United States produces insignificant amounts of chromite 
(chrome ore).44 The world's major chromium deposits are located in 
southern Africa (South Africa and Zimbabwe) and the Soviet Union. 
In 1984, imports accounted for eighty-two percent of chromium con-
sumption in the United States,45 with South Africa accounting for 
fifty-nine percent.46 Other major suppliers to the United States are 
the Philippines, Madagascar, Finland, Turkey, and the Soviet 
Union.47 The security of supply lines from the politically troubled 
southern African region is a major concern. 48 Expanded reliance 
upon the Soviet Union could create a dangerous and costly depen-
dence in times of national emergency.49 A National Materials Advi-
42Id. at 53; CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 135. 
43 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 53. 
What is important about chrome anyway? ... [I]f the U.S. producers do not 
receive chrome and cobalt, of which we have none, we will not be able to fly a jet 
airplane, ... build a car, run a train, build an oil refinery, build a power station, 
nuclear or conventional, [or] process foods .... 
. . . We are going to have to shut down our hospitals unless you want to be operated 
on a wood table with a rusty knife. You cannot build a computer, cannot build a 
computer tool, ... cannot build magnets so you would have to, therefore, close down 
most of our communications systems in the country and you could not process crude 
oil. That is just to mention a couple of minor things we would have to do without if 
we do not get chrome and cobalt under today's technology. 
Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review: Oversight Hearings on Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review 
Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Part II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 [hereinafter Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review, Part 
II] (statement of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Materials and Services, Allegheny-Ludlum 
Industries, Inc.). 
44 Murphy, supra note 30, at 198. There has been insignificant amounts of domestic mine 
production of chromium since 1961. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABIL-
ITY, supra note 4, at 138. United States chromium deposits are mostly in the Stillwater 
Complex in Montana, with additional but smaller deposits in California, Alaska, and Oregon. 
Id. at 53-54, 151-53. These deposits are limited and low grade, and, therefore, "are not 
considered close to being economically mineable at present." Id. at 54. For a discussion on 
United States domestic production prospects for chromium, see id. at 148-59. 
45 Foreign Metals, supra note 8, at 74. Since there is almost no domestic mine production 
of chromite, foreign sources supply nearly all of the United States requirements for chromium. 
TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 138. Recycling 
of scrap provides the United States with the remainder of its chromite needs. Id. at 53. 
Recycling accounted for approximately 18% of United States 1984 apparent consumption. 
Foreign Metals, supra note 8, at 74. 
46 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 53-54. 
47 Id. at 54. The major world suppliers of chromite to the United States in 1982 were: South 
Africa (59%), Phillipines (11%), Madagascar (9%), Finland (7%), Turkey (6%), Soviet Union 
(6%), and Albania (1%). Id. 
48 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 136. 
49 Id.; 50 U.S.C. § 98a(b) (1982); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2181 (1982). While South Africa has the 
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sory Board Study concluded that the United States "is strategically 
more vulnerable to a long-term chromium embargo than to an em-
bargo of any other natural resource, including petroleum."5o 
2. Cobalt 
Cobalt is crucial to the United States because of its many military 
and industrial uses51 for which substitution is difficult. 52 The principal 
use of cobalt is in superalloys that require high strength and very 
high temperatures. 53 
The United States does not produce cobalt. 54 In 1984, the United 
States was dependent on imports for ninety-five percent of its cobalt 
world's largest chromite reserves, the Soviet Union is actually the world's largest producer 
of chromium. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 
139. The Soviet Union once played a significant role in supplying the United States with 
chromium ore. Since the mid-1970's, however, its contribution to United States supplies has 
declined significantly. The Soviet Union currently exports nearly all of its chromite production 
to the Eastern bloc. The major reasons that have been suggested for the change in Soviet 
exports of chromium ore are "[dlecreasing reserves, increased costs of production, and political 
control over export policies .... " [d. at 138. For a discussion on foreign production of 
chromium, see id. at 137-48. 
50 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 136. 
51 [d. at 133. In 1982, the National Materials Advisory Board estimated that 50% of the 
consumption of cobalt was essential. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABIL-
ITY, supra note 4, at 67. 
52 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 54, 66. See 
also Murphy, supra note 30, at 199. 
53 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 54. In 1980, 
superalloys accounted for 6.3 million pounds or 41 percent of United States cobalt consumption. 
It is projected that 8.3 million pounds of cobalt will be used in the United States in the 
production of superalloys in 1995, and 12.9 mIllion pounds of cobalt will be required to meet 
domestic needs in 2010. [d. at 67. 
The aviation industry, therefore, is critically dependent upon cobalt alloys which are used 
in jet engines to withstand high temperatures. The F-l00 engine, used in F-15 and F-16 
fighter aircraft, contains approximately 150 pounds of cobalt. [d. Because of its unique hard-
ening qualities and resistance to corrosion and abrasion, cobalt is required in the manufacture 
of machine tools and bits, as a binder in cement carbides for metal cutting, and as a catalyst 
in petroleum refining to remove sulfur and heavy metals from petroleum. Murphy, supra note 
30, at 199; TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 67-
68. Cobalt is also used in electrical equipment where its strong magnetic properties make 
small, powerful, and long-lasting magnets. [d. at 69-70.· 
54 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 167. Cur-
rently, cobalt is not produced from domestic mines in the United States. Domestic deposits 
have been mined in the past and in 1958 reached a high yield of approximately 4.8 million 
pounds of cobalt. [d. The United States has large cobalt deposits, particularly at the Blackbird 
Mine in Idaho and the Madison Mine in Missouri. Substantial cobalt is also associated with 
copper-nickel deposits in the Duluth Gabbro of Minnesota and Gasquet Mountain in California. 
These reserves cannot be mined economically at the current world price of cobalt without 
government assistance. [d. at 167-73. See also Murphy, supra note 30, at 199. 
{ 
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needs,55 with recycling of purchased scrap supplying the balance. 56 
The largest supply sources of both for the United States and the 
rest of the free world are Zaire and Zambia. 57 In 1982, Zairian cobalt 
accounted for thirty-nine percent of United States imports, and 
Zambia nine percent. 58 These two southern African nations have the 
largest and richest cobalt reserves59 and are expected to dominate 
the world's cobalt supply far into the next century. 60 Exports of 
Zairian cobalt to the United States are vulnerable to supply inter-
ruption due to political instability, the breakdown of old equipment, 
and because of Zaire's "reliance on a complicated road, rail, and 
water transport system from point of production to port of export. "61 
3. Manganese 
The principal use of manganese is in steel production, which ac-
counts for approximately ninety percent of United States manganese 
consumption.62 Currently, no practicable alternatives to the use of 
manganese in steelmaking are available. 63 
No manganese ore is produced domestically.64 The United States 
imported ninety-nine percent of its supply in 1984.65 Domestic re-
66 Foreign Metals, supra note 8, at 74. 
56 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 54,159 (1982 
figures). 
67Id. at 159. In 1982, Zaire produced about 45% of the world's cobalt supply and Zambia 
contributed 13%. Id. 
56 Id. at 55. 
59 I d. at 54--55, 160. 
60 Id. at 54--55. For a discussion on foreign production of cobalt, see id. at 160-67. 
61 Murphy, supra note 30, at 199. 
62 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 55,71. The 
remainder is used in batteries and chemicals. Id. at 71. When iron is converted to steel, 
manganese must be added to remove the sulfur. Id. at 55. As an alloying element, manganese 
is also added to steel to impart strength and hardness. Id. at 55, 71. 
63 Id. at 55. See also Murphy, supra note 30, at 202. 
6<1 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 55. The last 
year of production of manganese ore in the United States was 1970. Historically, domestic 
production of manganese has contributed to United States requirements. The United States 
was self-sufficient in manganese during the last half of the 19th century. Since 1900, however, 
domestic production of manganese has not been able to keep up with the needs of the United 
States steel industry and other demands. United States production of manganese has steadily 
declined, even in wartime, from 23% of consumption during World War I, 13% during the 
Second World War, and only 8% during the Korean Conflict. Today, the prospects for pro-
duction of manganese from United States deposits is highly unlikely because domestic man-
ganese resources of significant size are very low in grade and too costly to exploit commercially 
at current prices. Id. at 184-86. 
66 Foreign Metals, supra note 8, at 74. The United States produces only one percent of 
manganese ore from domestic production of manganiferous ores that contain less than 35% 
manganese. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 55. 
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cycling of manganese from scrap materials is insignificant. 66 The 
Soviet Union and South Africa have the largest manganese deposits 
in the world. 67 Together, these two nations produced sixty-four per-
cent of total world manganese production in 1982.68 The largest 
suppliers of manganese ore to the United States are South Africa 
and Gabon. In 1982, South Africa accounted for fifty-two percent 
while Gabon supplied twenty-one percent of United States require-
ments. 69 All major sources of supply require long-distance transpor-
tation by sea, causing supply stability concern to the United States. 
This method of transport increases the vulnerability to supply inter-
ruption in the case of world conflict, political instability, or military 
interference with shipping. 70 
4. The Platinum Group Metals 
The platinum group metals include six metals which have similar 
properties. These metals are platinum, palladium, rhodium, iridium, 
osmium, and ruthenium. 71 These are among the scarcest of minerals 
and have become vital to modern industrial production because of 
their unique properties72 and stability in extreme environments. 73 
66 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 138. 
67 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 55,178. The 
Soviet Union and South Africa are not the only countries with large manganese deposits. 
Australia and Gabon contain substantial reserves of manganese ore "which could last a century 
or more at the current rate of production." I d. at 55-56. 
68 Id. at 177. In 1982, the Soviet Union accounted for 41 percent and South Africa 23 percent 
of total world manganese production. I d. at 178. The five nations of Gabon, Australia, Brazil, 
India, and China each made a significant contribution of over one million short tons of 
manganese ore in 1982. Id. at 177-78. For a discussion on foreign productions of manganese, 
see id. at 177-84. 
69Id. at 56. 
7°Id. at 55-56. See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2181 (1982) (general discussion of United States' 
vulnerability in its reliance on importation of critical minerals). CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, 
supra note 18, at 139 ("Of strategic concern is that the United States depends on only a few 
nations for most of its manganese."). 
71 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 139. 
72 Id. 
73 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 72. Platinum 
group metals catalyze many chemical reactions and are resistant to high temperatures and 
chemical attack. They are essential in catalytic applications in petroleum refining, chemical 
processing, and in the treatment of exhaust gas from automobile engines. Id. at 56, 72-74. 
The major consumption of platinum in the United States is in automobile catalytic converters, 
for which there is no satisfactory substitute. Id. at 56. The platinum group metals are also 
used as corrosion resistant materials in many uses, including contacts in telecommunication 
equipment, electrodes in ceramic capacitors, jewelry, and medical and dental equipment. Id. 
at 56, 72-77. See also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 139. 
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As with manganese, the principal producers of the platinum group 
metals are the Soviet Union and the Republic of South Africa. 74 
Mines in these two nations accounted for nearly ninety-five percent 
of the world's production of platinum group metals in 1982, and this 
production pattern is likely to continue in the future. 75 In 1984, the 
United States imported ninety-one percent of the platinum group 
metals it consumed. 76 With the largest source originating in South 
Africa, followed by the Soviet Union,77 the United States' depen-
dency on these two countries for imports of platinum group metals 
is a matter of strategic concern. 78 
Clearly, the nation's mineral security has become increasingly 
dependent on potentially unreliable foreign sources of supply.79 The 
dependence of the United States on foreign sources of nonfuel min-
erals is a significant factor in the national balance-of-payments defi-
cit, contributes to the loss of domestic employment, exposes the 
nation to supply disruption, and poses a risk to national security. 80 
To some observers, United States reliance on imports of foreign 
minerals constitutes a dangerous dependency, threatening a mate-
rials crisis more devastating than the recent energy crisis. 81 
74 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 192. While 
the Soviet Union is presently the world's largest producer of platinum group metals, its 
reserves are only one-fifth the size of those of South Africa. [d. at 57. 
75 [d. at 191-92. In 1982, the world depended on the Soviet Union for 54% of its platinum 
needs and on South Africa for 40%. [d. at 192. For a discussion on foreign production of 
platinum group metals, see id. at 190-95. 
76 Foreign Metals, supra note 8, at 74. The United States is virtually entirely dependent 
upon foreign imports for new supplies of platinum group metals. Domestic mine production 
supplies less than one percent of the nation's requirements, the remaining demand for platinum 
metals is supplied from recycled materials. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VUL-
NERABILITY, supra note 4, at 57. See also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 
139-40. Unlike the other first tier minerals, the United States is a minor producer of platinum 
group metals as a byproduct of copper mining. Platinum group metal deposits are located in 
Montana, Alaska, and Minnesota. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, 
supra note 4, at 196-200. 
77 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 57. 
78 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 140. See also Murphy, supra note 30, at 
203. 
79 50 U.S.C. app. § 2181 (1982); 50 U.S.C. §§ 98a(b) (1982); 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1982); 
30 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
80 S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 4872. See also, supra note 79. Experts have estimated that by the year 1990, 50% 
or more of all United States metal requirements will be imported, resulting in an annual trade 
deficit of over $100 billion based on 1980 prices. Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review, Part II, 
supra note 43, at 44 (statement of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Materials and Service, 
Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.). 
81 Holden, supra note 7, at 305. See also Cook, The Crisis that Didn't Happen, FORBES, 
Nov. 22, 1982, at 91. 
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III. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ONSHORE MINERALS 
AVAILABILITY 
A. Federal Policies in General 
The abundant mineral resources of the United States have con-
tributed to the development of an industrialized economy and a high 
standard of living. 82 Historically, government policies have encour-
aged access to federal lands for the development of domestic energy 
Some commentators have argued that the "minerals crisis" is overblown, and is not likely 
to occur. See generally Cook, supra; Polsgrove, Strategic Minerals;' Reality and Ruse, 
SIERRA, July/Aug. 1982, at 28; Shafer, Mineral Myths, 47 FOREIGN POLICY 154 (1982). They 
maintain that the United States has always been dependent on imports for a large share of 
its material needs and such reliance is a small share of the nation's total gross national product. 
Cook, supra, at 94. They also assert that the strategic minerals problem has been utilized by 
the mining industry and the Reagan administration to justify easing the environmental reg-
ulations related to mining and processing and opening large areas of federal land, including 
wilderness areas, to mining exploration. Polsgrove, supra, at 28. Moreover, "mineral myth" 
advocates note that the United States spends "only about $80 for each person in the country 
each year for the raw materials for all the metals the country uses." Singer, How Dependent 
Is U.S. on Strategic Minerals?, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1986, at 16, col. 3. 
It is generally accepted that the United States is and will continue to be import dependent 
on some minerals and materials, and because of this reliance the United States is vulnerable 
to supply disruptions. See supra note 79; ACTIONS TO PROMOTE A STABLE SUPPLY OF MIN-
ERALS, supra note 36, at 3. The consequences of a prolonged supply shortage of strategic and 
critical minerals would be severe. 
In today's technological society, the United States and the other industrialized nations 
of the world could not build a jet engine or an automobile, run a train, build an oil 
refinery, or construct a nuclear or conventional power station without adequate 
supplies of materials for which the United States is virtually 100 percent dependent 
on imports. We could not process food under our present laws, comply with our clean 
air and water laws, or meet sanitary hospital codes. We could not build computers, 
cutting tools, mining tools, magnets, or process crude oil, just to mention a few 
examples of the potential impact of supply disruptions. An adequate and stable supply 
of these materials is as vital to the industrial and economic health of the nation as 
nutrition is to the human body. 
S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, 
at 4874. 
82 S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 4872. See also TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra 
note 4, at 5; CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 351; GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, THE U.S. MINING AND MINERAL-PROCESSING INDUS-
TRY: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY]. 
Three factors contribute to the United States' heritage of abundant natural resources. First, 
the United States covers a very large land mass that includes a wide range of geological 
diversity. Second, the United States has a low population density which allows for large open 
spaces. Finally, as a result of the geographic scope and low popUlation density, the United 
States has a favorable ratio of domestic resources to population that is available to most of 
its citizens. CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 351. 
1988] DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS 231 
and mineral resources to contribute to the nation's economic and 
industrial growth.83 On the other hand, in the last twenty-five years, 
public interest in protecting and preserving surface resources on 
federal lands has grown. 84 In the 1970s and into the 1980s, federal 
efforts to protect the environment and to preserve cultural and 
aesthetic resources increased.85 Some government policies, including 
those of local government86 and Indian tribes,87 designed to protect 
environmental resources have restricted access to federal lands for 
domestic mineral exploration and development.88 Therefore, such 
federal decisions as wilderness and national monument designations, 
though not normally characterized as mineral decisions, have major 
consequences for mineral policy because these single-use designa-
tions exclude access to federal lands, add costs to development, and 
increase uncertainty in the effort to explore mineral resources. 89 
Over the past decade mineral resource development in the United 
States has become increasingly dependent upon decisions of a gov-
ernment that is, according to a congressional report, "increasingly 
opposed to such development."9o The major decisions of the federal 
government that affect domestic mineral development include public 
land access restrictions, environmental, health and safety regula-
tions, antitrust enforcement, capital formation, and tax policy.91 The 
nation's supply of mineral resources "has thereby become dependent 
not upon the free market system but upon the political process. "92 
As a result, mineral development in the United states has become 
difficult, time consuming, costly, and frequently impossible. 93 
B. Restrictions to Public Lands Access 
The government action that has most significantly impeded do-
mestic mineral production has been the restriction of access to fed-
83 P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 765 (1968). 
84 Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review, Part I, supra note 18, at 94 (statement of Charles D. 
Hylander, Deputy Director, International Division, United States General Accounting Office). 
85 Glaiser, Cultural Resource Preservation: A Consideration Before Mineral Development, 
28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 635 (1983). 
86 Barnhill, The Role of Local Government in Mineral Development, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. INST. 221 (1983); U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 27. 
87 Moore, Mineral Development on Indian Lands-Cooperation and Conflict, 28 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1983). 
88 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 27. 
89 See AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 1, 18-20. 
90 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 27. 
91 See generally id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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eral lands for mineral exploration and development. 94 Currently the 
federal government owns approximately 732 million acres, or about 
one-third of the land in the United States. 95 The federal government 
also retains control over the subsurface mineral rights of an addi-
tional sixty-three million acres96 and has jurisdiction over approxi-
mately one billion acres of offshore lands on the nation's outer con-
tinental shelf.97 Over ninety percent of the federal onshore land is 
located in the eleven contiguous western states and Alaska,98 whose 
public lands are the best hope for significant mineral discoveries. 99 
Federal lands are an essential part of the national mineral and 
energy base.lOo The American Petroleum Institute estimated that 
federal lands contain thirty-seven percent of the nation's undiscov-
ered crude oil, forty-three percent of the undiscovered natural gas, 
forty percent of the coal reserves, eighty percent of the recoverable 
oil shale reserves, and ninety-five percent of the tar sand deposits. 101 
Despite this optimistic appraisal of the public lands' mineral resource 
potential, in 1980 only about thirteen percent offederal onshore lands 
were under lease for oil and gas exploration and development. 102 
94 Note, United States Minerals Policy-A Proposal to Revitalize the Exploration and 
Development of Domestic Mineral Resources, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 881 (1982). See also AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 18. 
95 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1984 10 (1985) [hereinafter 
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1984]. See also AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, 
supra note 82, at 19. 
96 Withdrawal of Certain Lands from Mineral Leasing: Hearings on S. 2801 and H.R. 6542 
Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Reserved Water of the Senate Comm. on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2801] 
(statement of James Cook, District Landsman, Placid Oil Co.). 
97 Jones, The Development of Outer Continental Shelf Energy Resources, 11 PEPPERDINE 
L. REV. 9, 11 n.6 (1983). The outer continental shelf is the submerged lands on the continental 
margins of the United States which are subject to federal jurisdiction. These lands lie outside 
the three-mile zone of coastal submerged lands which are reserved to the states. See 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(a) (1982). 
98 See PUBLIC LANDS STATISTICS 1984, supra note 95, at 10. 
The amount of federally owned land in each state is graphically demonstrated by Table 5. 
99 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 59. The mineral wealth 
contained within western public lands is illustrated by the fact that Arizona contains 65% of 
United States estimated copper reserves, but 70% of the state's land is owned by the Federal 
Government. AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 19. 
100 See, e.g., Boskin, Robinson, O'Reilly, & Kumar, New Estimates of the Value of Federal 
Mineral Rights and Land, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 923 (1985). The value of federal land and oil 
and gas mineral rights is substantial. In 1981, these estimates were $175 billion and $819 
billion, respectively. Id. at 934. 
101 Hearings on S. 2801, supra note 96, at 150 (statement of James Cook, District Landsman, 
Placid Oil Co.). 
102 Id. 
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A 1977 Interior Department report concluded that forty-two per-
cent of public lands are closed to mineral activity, sixteen percent 
are severely restricted, and another ten percent are moderately 
restricted. 103 Thus, approximately seventy percent of federal lands 
have been withdrawn from mineral access. In the eleven western 
states, approximately forty-four percent of federal lands are closed 
to mineral leasing.104 At one time in our nation's history, ninety 
percent of all federal lands were available for mineral exploration 
and development. 105 
Much of the restricted access to mining activity results from the 
designation of increasing amounts of public lands as wilderness 
areas. 106 Such designations exclude access, add costs, and increase 
the uncertainty of efforts to find and produce minerals.107 The po-
103 u.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 60-61. An update study 
has not been made. It is estimated, however, that public lands now closed or restricted to 
mining have increased by 10 to 15%. Id. at 60. 
104 Hearings on S. 2801, supra note 96, at 191-92 (statement of Alfred H. Voelker, Research 
Staff, MBR, Resource Analysis Group, Oak Ridge National Laboratories). 
At the present time, it is estimated that in the eleven contiguous Western states, 6% of 
federal public lands are formally closed to mining, 38% are highly restricted, and 56% are 
open with moderate or slight restrictions. Id. at 191. Experts have concluded that by 1990 
the availability of western federal lands for mineral leasing will increase to about 70%. The 
availability of public lands will rise because many of the present restrictions are temporary 
and will be removed in the 1980s. Many of the restrictions on western federal lands are the 
result of planning programs implemented in the past two decades. These programs require 
that public lands being studied for possible wilderness designation be managed so as to 
preserve their wilderness characteristics. During the 1980s, it is expected that most of these 
land use decisions will have been made, and millions of acres of public land that is presently 
restricted will be open to mineral exploration. Id. at 191-92. The process of declassifying 
wilderness study areas has not occurred as rapidly or thoroughly as these experts had planned. 
The wilderness system has increased nearly 800% from what was originally contemplated by 
Congress when it passed the Wilderness Act in 1964. Id. at 99 (statement of David F. Work, 
Exploration Manager, Western Region, Amoco Production Co., U.S.A.). 
Significant amounts of public lands are also closed to oil and gas leasing. The General 
Accounting Office estimated that out of 410 million acres the Federal Government controls in 
the Lower 48 States, approximately 64 million acres are closed to oil and gas leasing. As much 
as 55% of these withdrawn lands were estimated to contain recoverable reserves of oil and 
gas. Id. at 2, 21. 
105 NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 4, at 29. 
106 See National Wilderness Preservation System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985). Commercial mining activities are prohibited in wilderness areas. Id. §§ 1131(c), 
1133(c). For discussion on wilderness policies and their effect on mineral development on 
public lands, see Short, Wilderness Policies and Mineral Potential on the Public Lands, 26 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 39 (1980); Hall, Mineral Exploration and Development in Bureau 
of Land Management Wilderness Study Areas, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 351 (1979); and Watson, 
Mineral and Oil and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and Other Specially Managed 
Federal Lands in the United States, 29 ROCKl MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37 (1983). 
107 See Bennett, Public Land Policy: Reconciliation of Public Use and Private Development, 
11 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 311 (1966); Loesch, Multiple Uses of Public Lands-Accom-
234 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:217 
tential size of the National Wilderness Preservation System is huge. 
Currently over eighty million acres of land are designated as wil-
derness, and an additional 149 million acres have been set aside as 
wilderness study or candidate areas. 108 The potential federal acreage 
devoted exclusively to preservation of wilderness values and with-
drawn from mineral activity is approximately 229 million acres, or 
thirty-one percent of all federal lands, an area equal in size to Cali-
fornia, Nevada, and Arizona combined. 109 The withdrawals that have 
had the most significant impact on potential domestic mineral pro-
duction have occurred in Alaska, which contains "probably the most 
highly mineralized area in the United States [with] the potential for 
exploration beyond imagination."lIo However, over 100 million acres 
in Alaska have been restricted from mineral exploration, and only 
seventeen percent of the state is actually open to mining.ll1 
Proposals to reduce restrictions on federal land use, including 
suggestions to authorize mineral leasing in wilderness areas, have 
resulted in public opposition.1I2 There is strong public opinion that 
the last places the federal government should conduct mineral leas-
ing is in wilderness areas. 1I3 An interesting example of this debate 
is the controversy surrounding oil and gas exploration. Of the 137 
million acres of federal land under lease in the lower 48 states, up 
to eighty percent of the leases will expire without any exploratory 
odation or Choosing Between Conflicting Uses, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1971); and 
U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 27. 
Nevada State Senator Richard Blakemore testified before a congressional committee in 1980 
that the major problem confronting the Nevada mining industry is the threat that additional 
lands will be declared wilderness areas, locking away forever without adequate explanation 
or inventory the resources located within those areas. 
lOB Hearings on S. 2801, supra note 96, at 99 (statement of David F. Work, Exploration 
Manager, Western Region, Amoco Production Co., U.S.A.). 
109 Id. 
uo National Materials Policy: Hearing on H.R. 2743 Before the Subcomm. on Science, 
Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1980) (statement of Howard L. Edwards, General Attorney, Anaconda 
Copper Co.) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2743]. 
III Velocci, Minerals, The Resource Gap, 68 NATION'S Bus. 33, 36 (1980). The restrictions 
on mineral development in Alaska are due mostly to the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). ANILCA, as 
originally drafted by Representative Morris Udall, Chairman ofthe House Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee, which had jurisdiction over Alaska land issues, excluded from mineral 
access approximately 70% of the highly favorable mineral areas in Alaska. Nonfuel Minerals 
Policy Review, Part I, supra note 18, at 85-86. 
112 H.R. REP. No. 638, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 638]. 
113 Id. 
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drilling.114 Furthermore, it is estimated that wilderness areas and 
proposed wilderness areas contain only three percent of the nation's 
undiscovered oil resources and two percent of the undiscovered gas 
resources. 115 Given these facts, opponents of federal leasing argue 
that the government should "simply refuse to issue leases in wilder-
ness and wilderness candidate areas unless and until all existing 
leases are fully explored and developed. "116 
Increased access to public lands for mineral development is nec-
essary if the United States is to reduce its reliance on foreign imports 
of strategic materials.117 National commissions that have studied 
domestic minerals policy have recommended increased mineral pro-
duction from federal lands. 118 Exploration of federal lands is needed 
to inject adequate mineral information into the decisionmaking pro-
cess. Current mineral reserves estimates are too speculative to use 
as a basis to formulate public policy.119 Furthermore, the methods 
used in mineral exploration require access to large land areas in 
order to locate the relatively small areas with mineral potential. 120 
"The probabilities are relatively strong that, when deposits are iden-
tified they will be on federal lands .... "121 
In addition to withdrawing acreage from mineral development, 
wilderness designations have a "chilling" effect on industry acquisi-
tion of leasable properties close to a restricted wilderness area. 122 
114 Id. 
115 Hearings on S. 2801, supra note 96, at 182 (statement of Alfred H. Voelker, Research 
Staff, MBR, Resource Analysis Group, Oak Ridge National Laboratories). 
116 H.R. REP. No. 638, supra note 112, at 4-5. 
117 Hearings on H.R. 2743, supra note 110, at 85 (statement of Howard L. Edwards, General 
Attorney, Anaconda Copper Co.); id. at 89 (statement of Richard Barrett, Dresser Minerals 
Division, Dresser Industries, Inc.). 
118 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 58-59. See also PUBLIC 
LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, A REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 121-38 (1970) [hereinafter ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S 
LAND]. 
119 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 19; ONE THIRD OF THE 
NATION'S LAND, supra note 118, at 123. The amount and quality of minerals resources 
information has frequently been described as limited and superficial. AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 19; ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra 
note 118, at 123. The very nature of lands suitable for wilderness designation-areas "un-
trammeled by man"-means that they are the least explored of all federal lands. See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1131(c) (1982). 
120 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 19. 
121Id. 
122 Sagebrush Rebellion: Impacts on Energy and Minerals: Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 160-61 (1980) [hereinafter Sagebrush Rebellion Hearing] (statement of Gordon 
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Federal agencies are also closing public lands to mineral activity 
through management decisions under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA).123 As a result of FLPMA, the Depart-
ment of the Interior has categorized no-leasing-decisions as admin-
istrative land management decisions rather than identifying them, 
as contemplated by the Act, as withdrawals. 124 The Interior De-
partment does not maintain adequate records to identify the extent 
of its no-leasing administrative decisions. 125 There are also restric-
tions to mining in the National Parks. 126 
The Public Land Law Review Commission stated in its 1970 report 
that "mineral exploration and development should have a preference 
over some or all other uses on much of our public lands."127 Actual 
policy, however, has been to the contrary. "[AJ functional bias exists 
at the federal level, in favor of preservation and against development 
of resources on the federal lands. "128 Indeed, "federal land use plan-
ning does not recognize the unique and essential nature of mineral 
development. "129 As a result of land withdrawals and the uncertainty 
over access to federal lands in the future, some mineral projects 
have closed or moved outside the United States. 130 
L. Pine of Conoco). Conoco has refrained from obtaining mineral tracts close to a designated 
wilderness area, and "many ... potential deposits will never be fully evaluated." [d. at 161. 
123 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Hearings on S. 2801, supra note 
96, at 21-22. 
124 Hearings on S. 2801, supra note 96, at 21-22. 
125 [d. at 22. 
126 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The 1976 Mining in the Parks Act 
prohibited further mineral exploration in six National Park Service areas and placed environ-
mental restrictions on development of existing mining claims in these areas. [d. For a discus-
sion on mining on National Park Service Lands, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT 
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MINES AND MINING, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR 
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES, MINING ON NATIONAL PARKS SERVICE 
LANDS-WHAT Is AT STAKE? (Sept. 24, 1981); Novak, Mining and the National Park Service, 
2 J. ENERGY L. & POL'y 165 (1982). 
127 ONE THIRD OF OUR NATION'S LAND, supra note 118 at 122. 
128 Peck, "And Then There Were None," Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability of 
Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-13 (1979). It is 
important to note, however, that some observers have found the Reagan administration to be 
aggressively insensitive to the environment. One critic went so far as to call Reagan the "only 
openly anti-environmental president in our history." Oakes, Reagan's Record of the Environ-
ment Fails to Match His Claims, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 4, col. 3. 
129 Hearings onH.R. 2743, supra note 110, at 188 (statement ofG.A. Barber, Vice President, 
Exploration and Geology, Anaconda Copper Co.). 
130 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 22; Nonfuel Minerals 
Policy Review, Part II, supra note 43, at 131 (remarks of Mr. Howard L. Edwards, General 
Counsel, Anaconda Copper Co., and Chairman, Committee on Public Lands, American Mining 
Congress). For example, St. Joe Minerals Company has relocated most of its mineral explo-
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c. Environmental and Health and Safety Regulations 
Federal law affects the minerals industries. 131 Among significant 
regulatory laws are the General Mining Law of 1872,132 National 
Environmental Policy Act,133 Clean Air Act,134 Clean Water Act,135 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,136 Occupational Safety 
and Health Act,137 Mine Safety and Health Act,138 Mine Reclamation 
Act,139 and Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 140 
These laws regulate the mining of raw materials, promote the 
safety of miners and plant workers, and minimize the environmental 
impacts associated with mining operations. 141 These laws, however, 
impede domestic mineral production.142 While these laws have un-
questioned social and economic importance, congressional testimony 
and studies have concluded that federal regulatory policies: 
(1) Have caused a rapid decline in the United States raw 
materials industry; 
(2) Have hindered the efficient production and fabrication of 
many industrial materials; 
(3) Have eroded the ability of the United States mining indus-
try to contribute to the nation's security; 
(4) Have economically burdened basic industries such as metal 
extraction; 
(5) Have placed the United States materials industries at an 
unfair disadvantage to their foreign competitors; 
(6) Have contributed to low profitability in these industries; 
(7) Have discouraged new production; 
ration from Alaska to Canada's Yukon Territory because of federal land access restrictions. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 22. 
131 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 369. For an identification and discussion 
of federal laws that affect domestic minerals production, see Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review, 
Part II, supra note 43, at 444-49; and U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 
19, at 50-58. For a discussion on the impact of federal environmental laws on mining opera-
tions, see Friedman, The Operational Impact of NEPA and Related Environmental Laws, 
Regulations, and Orders on Mineral Operations, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 47 (1974). 
132 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
133 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
134 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
135 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
136 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
137 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
138 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
139 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
140 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
141 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 369-70. 
142Id. at 370. See also AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 
23. 
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(8) Have contributed to the shutting down of production ca-
pacity; 
(9) Have reduced access to federal lands containing potentially 
rich deposits of various minerals; and 
(10) Have become one of the most significant materials-related 
problems now facing the nation. 143 
The financial cost of compliance with regulatory standards ham-
pers domestic mineral exploration and development144 and may reach 
fifteen percent of overhead costS. 145 The Department of Commerce 
concluded that it will cost the United States copper industry over 
$1.4 billion (in 1974 dollars), from 1978 to 1987, to comply with 
federal pollution control standards and land use requirements. 146 
Industry leaders' testimony before Congress indicates further that 
probably two and perhaps three of the United States' thirteen copper 
smelters have closed as a result of environmental regulations, re-
ducing the United States' end product copper producing capacity by 
about twenty-five percent. 147 The relatively high compliance costs of 
143 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 370. 
On the other hand, representatives of environmental groups point out that these laws 
provide benefits to the United States, including: 
[1.] Preserving the environmental integrity of the [n]ation's land, water, and 
air resources; 
[2.] Protecting the interests of consumers; 
[3.] Maintaining healthy [competition] in the market by preventing predatory 
monopolistic practices; 
[4.] Enhancing the decision-making process regarding future Federal actions 
affecting the environment; and 
[5.] Protecting worker health and safety. 
I d. at 370-71. 
144 See AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 26; U.S. MINERALS 
VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 56; NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & 
PLANNING, supra note 4, at 37-38. 
145 See N01~fuel Minerals Policy Review, Part I, supra note 18, at 150-51 (statement of 
Herman Enzer, United States Department of the Interior). 
146 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 56. In 1976, United States 
businesses spent $35 billion for pollution control, and these expenditures were large enough 
to affect the national economy. NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, supra 
note 4, at 37. 
147 Hearings on H.R. 2743, supra note 110, at 79 (statement of Richard W. Banghart, 
Manager, Nevada Mines Division, Kennecott Minerals Co.). 
An illustration of forced plant closures due to the cost of compliance with environmental 
regulations is the closure in 1979 of the Monaca, Pennsylvania, zinc smelter. That smelter 
produced about 25% of United States capacity in 1978 and was closed after the company 
expended $35 million over the preceeding five years to comply with the Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) pollution standards. The company was not able to commit an 
additional $25 million to comply with new lead standards promulgated by EPA and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration because of financial losses suffered during the 
previous two years. U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 33. 
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federal regulatory standards may also precipitate relocation of min-
eral exploration and development projects to foreign areas. 148 
On public land that is available for mineral exploration, obtaining 
the federal, state, and local government permits required to develop 
a mineral project can cause lengthy administrative delays and in-
crease the cost of mineral projects. 149 Processing lease applications 
for exploration and development on federal lands requires coordi-
nation among the United States Geological Survey, the Bureau of 
Land Management of the Department of the Interior, and the United 
States Forest Service. 150 The minimum processing time for approval 
of a prospective lease is seventeen months and for a mineral lease 
and mining plant permit, three years. 151 Contributing to cost and 
delay in domestic mineral production is the fact that government 
policy decisions regarding mineral production are often uncoordi-
nated and contradictory, and may vary according to circumstances 
and the government agency involved. 152 
148 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 28--30; see also NEED 
FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 4, at 24-25. 
149 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 23,29. For illustration, 
in August 1976 a United States firm applied for two federal prospecting permits covering 
tracts in Idaho. It took 24 months of processing time for the permits to reach the Secretary 
of the Interior's Office for final signature. [d. at 23. 
150 [d. 
151 [d. Final approval to develop a domestic mineral project is a time consuming process 
that usually necessitates [1] preparation and approval of environmental impact statements, 
and air, water quality, and solid waste disposal plans; [2] preparation of a Cultural Resource 
Survey Report by a state historical preservation officer; [3] negotiation of water rights; and 
[4] a variety of state and local clearances. [d. Other industrialized nations have similar 
environmental requirements, but the time required to obtain approval is shorter, and the 
increase to project costs are thereby minimized. For example, it takes two years to plan and 
construct a steel mill in Japan, a country with strict environmental standards, and costs about 
$600 per annual ton of capacity. The time delay in obtaining administrative approval is a main 
reason for the difference in project costs. [d. 
152 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 29--30. 
Every other country in the world, particularly the Communist bloc countries, does 
everything in its power to support its minerals industry. Yet we seem to be destined 
to travel along a path of minerals self-destruction. Each Federal agency goes on its 
independent way, concerned only with its own particular mission. The Environmental 
Protection Agency oversees the industry by way of the Clean Air Act, the Water 
Pollution Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration imposes health and safety 
standards. The Department of the Treasury looks only to the integrity of the tax 
code. In addition, Interior apparently does not understand the importance of minerals 
in its land planning process. The national tragedy is that no element of the Federal 
Government is looking at the total question of how all the regulatory processes are 
having an adverse impact on this national interest. 
Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review, Part [, supra note 18, at 3 (statement of Rep. James D. 
Santini, Nev., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining). 
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Environmental protection is a worthwhile national goal. The policy 
conflicts, however, among mineral production, environmental pro-
tection, and the United States' balance of trade are complex. 153 The 
trend toward environmental protection regardless of economic im-
pact has led to burdensome regulations, imposes substantial costs, 
and threatens the continued operation of some domestic mining proj-
ects "which may not be able either to achieve compliance or to remain 
competitive with foreign producers that do not have to meet such 
standards."l54 Furthermore, observers dispute the mineral indus-
try's financial and technical ability to comply with regulations, as 
well as the value of anticipated benefits from compliance. 155 Domestic 
mineral operations incur higher costs due to compliance with envi-
ronmental and health and safety standards set by the federal gov-
ernment. 156 The minerals industry maintains that this investment in 
regulatory compliance could be better allocated to modernizing fa-
cilities so that the industry would be competitive in the world min-
erals trade. 157 
D. Antitrust Enforcement 
Capital intensive industries, such as mining, can benefit from the 
pooling of money, skills, property, equipment, and knowledge by two 
or more companies for a particular business project. 158 Such pooling 
of resources spreads costs and risks in developing the project. 159 The 
traditional hostility of United States antitrust policies toward joint 
ventures discourages domestic firms from initiating one of the most 
attractive financing alternatives available to them160 because: 
[1] U. S. antitrust laws are based on definitions of monopoly and 
competition that do not recognize the role of foreign competition 
in the domestic market. 
153 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 33. 
154 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 39; U.S. MINERALS 
VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 51. The relatively high costs of automobile 
emission control standards for the mineral industry in the United States has led to concern 
that the development of new mineral projects may shift to other countries. AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 28. 
155 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 26,39. 
156 [d. at 39. "The cost of labor, including wages, fringe benefits, and health and safety 
measures, can account for as much as one-third of total production costs in some [domestic] 
mineral projects." [d. at 38. 
157 Hearings on H.R. 2743, supra note 110, at 78 (statement of Richard W. Banghart, 
Manager, Nevada Mines Division, Kennecott Minerals Co.). 
158 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 34. 
15. [d. 
160 [d.; U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 44. 
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[2] U.S. antitrust laws are nonspecific, and companies often 
spend considerable time evaluating proposed joint arrangements 
only to find that after initiation they are subject to Government 
surveillance and investigation. 
[3] The extent of the applicability of U.S. antitrust laws to 
international activities of American multinational corporations is 
unclear and confusing. 
[4] The Justice Department is antagonistic toward the Webb-
Pomerene Act, a major antitrust exemption available to certain 
U. S. exporters. 161 
241 
Federal antitrust law dates from the Sherman Act of 1890162 and 
the Clayton163 and Federal Trade Commission Acts164 of 1914. The 
United States antitrust laws are intended to support competition 
and protect the American consumer from collusive business prac-
tices. 165 These three laws were enacted in an era of powerful oil, 
railroad, and other "trusts,"166 at a time when foreign producers held 
an insignificant percentage of domestic markets and definitions Of 
monopoly and competition were based on domestic production. 167 
Foreign competition in the world minerals market has increased, 
but the antitrust laws have not been updated to reflect the compe-
tition's impact on the domestic minerals industry.168 Increasingly, 
161 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 34. "The Webb-
Pomerene Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982)] is a special antitrust exemption which permits the 
formation of collective export associations of United States producers of 'goods, wares, or 
merchandise' so that they may compete more effectively in overseas [markets] .... " AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 37. To qualify, the association 
must engage solely in export trade. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1982). The Justice Department recom-
mends the revocation of the Act because it does not require businesses to demonstrate that 
market conditions justify formation of an association, and to qualify companies need only to 
register with the Federal Trade Commission. AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, 
supra note 82, at 37; see 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1982). 
162 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Sherman Act prohibits restraints of trade 
affecting United States domestic and international commerce. Id. § 1. The Act also prohibits 
domestic and international attempts to monopolize trade. Id. § 2. 
163 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Clayton Act prohibits price discrimi-
nation, certain exclusive dealing arrangements, and outlaws mergers and acquisitions which 
would tend to create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition. Id. §§ 13-14. 
164 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Federal Trade Commission Act has 
broad provisions prohibiting such practices as price fixing, boycotts, and anticompetitive 
mergers. Id. § 45. 
165 H.R. REP. No. 49, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS, at 2572-73. 
166 See generally J. CISE, W. LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 16-24 (9th ed. 1986); E. KINTNER, 1 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY, 
COMMON LAW, AND AN INTRODUCTION TO '!'HE SHERMAN ACT 77-124 (1980). 
167 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 35. 
168 Id.; see also U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 43. "[T]he view 
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world mineral markets are dominated by state-owned or state-con-
trolled enterprises whose national policies dictate behavior that often 
does not conform to the competitive, private enterprise model upon 
which United States antitrust policy is based. 169 For example, un-
profitable mineral production may be continued despite reduced con-
sumer demand in order to produce foreign exchange earnings or to 
maintain employment levels as a means of preventing social un-
rest.170 In contrast to the United States, the European Economic 
Community and Japan have liberalized their antitrust laws signifi-
cantly to permit domestic companies to improve production and 
encourage small, inefficient firms to combine into larger, more effi-
cient operations. 171 
United States antitrust laws are general in language and do not 
specifically indentify legal and illegal practices. Actual policy di-
rected at promoting competition and controlling monopolistic busi-
ness activity has been established largely by judicial decisions and 
agency enforcement. 172 Business firms considering a joint venture 
must invest considerable time and resources examining whether the 
partnership might violate United States antitrust laws.173 The per-
ceived threat of government investigation for antitrust violation has 
inhibited a number of firms from forming joint ventures174 and has 
discouraged foreign firms from participating in joint ventures with 
United States businesses. 175 
E. Capital Formation Problems 
Three characteristics distinguish investment in the nonfuel min-
erals industry from investment in other industries: (1) large capital 
requirements; (2) long lengths of time before debt retirement; and 
of the United States as a [single, predominant] market for purposes of antitrust analysis is 
largely obsolete." [d. 
169 [d. at 44. 
170 [d. 
171 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 35; see also U.S. 
MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 44. 
172 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 35. 
173 [d. 
174 [d. at 36. 
17. AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 36. One of the reasons 
why foreign firms hesitate to enter into joint ventures with American companies is that "at 
any point during the investigation of a joint undertaking involving U.S. firms, the records of 
all concerned parties, including foreign firms, can be subpoenaed, even when the operation is 
outside the United States." [d. 
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(3) the high risk nature of such investments. 176 "Mining is the most 
capital intensive of all industries."177 A $100 million project is com-
mon, and expenditures on a single project can exceed $1 billion. 178 
Capital is committed for considerable periods of time before revenue 
is generated from the project. Long lead times of as much as five to 
ten years are required for a new mine to be developed to full pro-
duction. 179 Few companies have the means to finance such projects 
from cash generated through operations, and outside investors, usu-
ally commercial lending institutions, are required to provide the 
needed capital. 180 The federal government's restrictions to public 
land access and burdensome environmental standards on mining and 
mineral processing have hindered the ability to generate funds from 
these sources. 181 Government actions have increased costs, impeded 
capital formation, and discouraged investment in mineral projects in 
the United States,182 and the lack of available capital has hindered 
domestic mining firms from expanding and modernizing mineral pro-
duction. l83 
F. Tax Policy Problems 
Tax policy has an important influence on domestic mineral pro-
duction, the profitability of mining properties, and the financial 
health of the domestic industry.l84 The federal income tax system 
does not encourage investment in the mining industry to the extent 
provided by most other countries. 185 Taxes in the United States on 
mineral producers are higher than those in most other industrialized 
176 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 374; see also AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. 
MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 16. 
177 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 38. 
178 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 16. 
179 See CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 373-74. 
180 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 30. 
181 See id. at 25; CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 374. 
182 See AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 25; see also NEED 
FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 4, at 25. 
183 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 16; CONGRESSIONAL 
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 375. "[R]esearch, development, and technological innovation, 
especially related to improved materials and new processing technologies, are important 
factors which affect [the Nation's]long-terrn capability for economic competitiveness, as well 
as for adjustment to interruptions in supply of critical minerals and materials." 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(a)(4) (Supp. III 1985). 
184 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 45. 
185 [d.; see also U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 41. 
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nations. 186 Under United States tax laws, capital recovery for rein-
vestment is much slower for American industry than for similar 
industries in most foreign countries. 187 Uncertainty about the future 
tax structure also detracts from desired investment. Changes and 
major reform in United States tax laws undermine the stability 
needed to make long-term planning and financial decisions. 188 For-
eign governments allow firms to recover a higher percentage of 
capital outlays in the early years of new projects which in turn 
provides funds for earlier capital investment. 189 The early recovery 
of capital expenditures is particularly important during periods of 
high inflation, such as the nation experienced during the 1970s, 
because it minimizes the effects of inflation on depreciation allow-
ances. 190 
Federal tax laws, therefore, are among the obstacles confronting 
the United States' domestic mining industry since they do not rec-
ognize the capital formation needs and cost of operations placed on 
the industry. The federal government must provide greater incentive 
for investment in the mining industry and alleviate the burden im-
posed on the industry by stabilizing tax laws and allowing faster 
recovery of capital expenditures. 191 
G. The Effect of Government Policy on the Domestic Minerals 
Industry 
During the 1970s, the domestic minerals industry experienced a 
severe and prolonged downturn leading to concern about its financial 
health. Contributing factors included the cost of implementing en-
vironmental programs, the increase in debt for many firms that 
186 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, ASSESSING THE IMPACT 
OF FEDERAL AND STATE TAXES ON THE DOMESTIC MINERALS INDUSTRY 1 (June 8, 1981) 
[hereinafter IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE MINERALS INDUSTRY]. 
187 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 46; CONGRESSIONAL 
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 375. 
188 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 48. 
189 [d. at 48-49. 
190 [d. at 49. 
191 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 42. There are three impor-
tant provisions of the federal tax code which support the domestic minerals industry: the 
depletion allowance, the investment tax credit, and the expensing privileges for exploration 
and development expenditures. IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE MINERALS INDUSTRY, supra note 
186 at 5. The depletion allowance provides a tax deduction for the depletion of natural 
resources. [d. at 5. The investment tax credit provides a credit against federal tax liability 
for a percent of the cost of acquiring such depreciable assets as equipment and machinery. 
[d. at 40. Federal tax laws provide tax deductions for costs associated with mine exploration 
and development. [d. at 49. 
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previously had relied primarily on equity financing, and competition 
from foreign producers. Government subsidies and the strong dollar 
aid foreign mineral producers, making their low cost products at-
tractive to United States customers and depressing world mineral 
prices. 192 The depression in the mining industry is the latest example 
of an industrial megatrend-the shift of the production and process-
ing of basic materials, including steel, from the United States to the 
developing nations of the Third World. 193 Lower prices benefit man-
ufacturers and consumers, but some observers are concerned that 
the mining industry's problems may risk national security. Repre-
sentative Morris K. Udall, chairman of the House Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, asserts that the United States "need[s] 
a copper industry, for defense purposes if nothing else. "194 
Although the natural distribution and quality of mineral deposits 
are major factors in mineral availability, in the United States, gov-
ernment policies have also limited domestic exploration and devel-
opment. 195 In contrast to United States' restrictions on mineral op-
erations, foreign governments often provide substantial incentives 
and subsidies to their mineral industries to encourage development 
192 The Death of Mining, supra note 33, at 65; see also Houston, Can Anything Shake the 
Depression in Metals?, Bus. WK., Mar. 22, 1985, at 245. For a discussion on the demise of 
the mining industry, see Note, supra note 94; AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, 
supra note 82. 
193 The Death of Mining, supra note 33, at 64-65. "[T]he Nation's industrial base, including 
the capacity to process minerals and materials, is deteriorating-both in terms of facilities 
and in terms of a trained labor force." 30 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985). The economic 
condition of the mining industry has deteriorated to the point that the United States is in 
danger of losing 75% of its copper industry, 40% to 50% of its iron-ore industry, and 90% of 
its potash industry. Hearings on Nat'l Critical Materials Act, supra note 3, at 57 (statement 
of T.S. Ary, President, Minerals Exploration Division, Kerr-McGee Corp. and Chairman, 
Minerals Availability Committee, American Mining Congress). 
The shift of the production and processing of basic materials from the United States to the 
developing nations is primarily due to cheap labor, government support of mineral operations, 
and very low cost reserves. The Death of Mining, supra note 33, at 64-65, 67. For example, 
Chilean copper workers earn only one tenth of what United States copper companies pay 
their workers. [d. at 67. The Chilean government of military strongman, Augusto Pinochet, 
has monumental problems, and internal pressure keeps copper production and exports high 
despite reduced demand and depressed prices for the metal. [d. at 65, 67. Accelerated copper 
production provides employment in a country where 25% of the work force is idle, and 
generates foreign exchange to maintain Chile's international debt payments without imposing 
unpopular austerity measures. [d. at 67. Furthermore, many of the richest mineral deposits 
in the United States are close to depletion and the remaining ore grade is frequently too 
costly to mine with current prices. [d. at 65. 
194 [d. at 65; Santini, The Growing Crisis in the Strategic and Critical Minerals of the 
United States, 7 J. LEGIS. 63 (1980). 
195 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 18. 
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within their countries. 196 Government actions have not only hindered 
domestic mineral development but in some cases have actually as-
sisted foreign competition. For example, the federal government 
supported the World Bank's International Finance Corporation's de-
cision to provide $1 billion to modernize and expand the Cananea 
copper project in Mexico, located thirty miles south of the United 
States. 197 This assistance was provided despite the severe depression 
in the copper industry198 and "the possible harm this extension ... 
might cause [to] United States copper producers."199 
Given the traditional hostility of many federal policies toward the 
mining and minerals processing industries,200 it is not surprising that 
the minerals industry tends to view the federal government as an 
adversary.201 A representative of Anaconda Copper Company stated 
in a congressional hearing: "Having been in this industry for a long 
time, I am convinced most of our problems are created by the 
Government and in no way can the Government be absolved. "202 
Government representatives tend to concur that the Department of 
the Interior, which oversees all aspects of federal land management, 
has adopted policies that have proved to be counterproductive to 
mineral development.203 One government report stated that "the 
orientation of the Department of the Interior . . . has been one of 
fundamental skepticism if not outright opposition to mineral explo-
196 Id. at 23-24, 32--33; see also NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, 
supra note 4, at 26-27. "[W]hile other nations have developed and implemented specific long-
term research and technology programs to develop high-performance materials, no such policy 
and program evolution has occurred in the United States." 30 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) (Supp. III 
1985). 
197 Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials: Hearings on the Geopolitics of Strategic 
and Critical Materials Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical 
Materials] (statement of Sen. James A. McClure, Idaho). 
198Id. The Federal Government justified assisting in the expansion of Cananea's copper 
production facilities as a program in the Nation's interest. According to the State Department, 
"Mexico's continued economic development is very important to its political stability," and a 
viable Mexican export trade is required to service its debt to United States banks. Id. at 36. 
199 Id. 
200 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 27,44. 
201 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 378-79. 
202 Hearings onH.R. 2743, supra note 110, at 83 (statement of Howard L. Edwards, General 
Attorney, Anaconda Copper Co.). 
203 There have been proposals to designate the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as the 
nation's advocate for minerals development. Interior May Turn BLM into 'Minerals Advo-
cate,' Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1987, at 20, col. 1. Such single-use designation, however, 
may conflict with FLPMA's requirements that the BLM manage public lands according to 
mUltiple use. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1982). 
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ration and development."204 Western states, objecting to the large 
percentage of their land owned by the federal government, are also 
dissatisfied with federal land management policies. 205 The adversarial 
relationship between the federal government and the minerals in-
dustry has been characterized "as the nation's most serious defi-
ciency regarding materials policy and ... represent[s] one of the 
major causes of materials supply and other economic problems."206 
IV. PAST COMMISSION AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY ON MINERALS 
POLICY 
A. Major Commissions on National Materials Policy 
Although concern about the United States' vulnerability to mineral 
supply disruptions has only recently received widespread national 
attention, it has been an issue debated in and out of government for 
decades. 207 President Theodore Roosevelt's National Conservation 
Commission, the first national commission to examine the use of the 
nation's natural resources, predicted in 1909 that domestic resources 
of petroleum and high grade iron ore would be depleted by mid-
century.208 During the period 1951-1976, four major study commis-
sions on minerals policy were created by the federal government, 
two by the White House and two by Congress. 209 
The two Presidential Commissions were created in response to 
materials shortages during wartime. 210 The President's Materials 
Policy Commission was created in 1951 due to President Truman's 
concern over the materials supply shortages experienced during 
World War II and the Korean War.211 Known as the Paley Commis-
sion in honor of its chairman, William S. Paley, it developed a mas-
sive and comprehensive analysis of the long range aspects of the 
204 u.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 59. 
205 See Titus, The Nevada "Sagebrush Rebellion" Act: A Question of Constitutionality, 23 
ARIZ. L. REV. 263 (1981); Mollison & Eddy, The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Simplistic Response 
to the Complex Problems of Federal Land Management, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1982); 
Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 317 (1980); Comment, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public 
Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505. 
206 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 378-79. 
207 [d. at 32. 
208 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 8. 
209 [d. at 8-13; see also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 32-39. 
210 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 8-10. 
211 [d. at 8; see also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 32-33. 
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nation's materials supply problems.212 In its five-volume report to 
the President, entitled Resources for Freedom,213 the Commission 
recognized that no nation can be totally self-sufficient in minerals. 214 
It specifically rejected the materials self-sufficiency argument, even 
for national security reasons, arguing instead in favor of the "least 
cost principle. "215 According to this principle, national minerals policy 
should be based on buying at the least cost possible,216 and "foreign 
imports provide least-cost benefits to the consumer."217 
The 1954 Report of the President's Cabinet Committee on Min-
erals Policy, known as the Eisenhower Report, emphasized the gov-
ernment's role in strengthening domestic mineral production and 
building mineral stockpiles to improve the nation's national secu-
rity.218 Like the Paley Report, the Eisenhower Report called atten-
tion to the United States' growing minerals import dependency219 
and how the country had completed a "slow transition from a raw 
materials surplus nation to a raw materials deficit nation. "220 
In 1970, Congress established the National Commission on Mate-
rials Policy under Title II of the Resource Recovery Act. 221 The 
purpose of the Commission was "to enhance environmental quality 
and conserve materials by developing a national materials policy to 
utilize present resources and technology more efficiently, to antici-
pate the future materials requirements of the nation and the world, 
and to make recommendations on the supply, use, recovery, and 
disposal of materials. "222 Like the Paley and Eisenhower Commis-
sions, the National Commission on Materials Policy recognized the 
role of foreign supplies in meeting domestic mineral requirements , 223 
and concluded that "in the interest of national security, it is unwise 
212 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 33; see also U.S. MINERALS VULNERA-
BILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 8-9. 
213 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 33. "The five volumes of the study were 
titled individually, as follows: I, Foundations for Growth and Security; II, The Outlook for 
Key Commodities; III, The Outlook for Energy Sources; IV, The Promise of Technology; and 
V, Selected Reports to the Commission." [d. 
214 [d. at 35. 
215 [d. 
216 [d. 
217 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 12. 
218 [d. at 9-10. 
219 [d. 
220 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 34 (quoting final report of the Paley 
Commission entitled Resources for Freedom). 
221 Pub. L. No. 91-512, § 202, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970); see also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, 
supra note 18, at 35. 
= Pub. L. No. 91-512, § 202, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970). See also id. § 204, 84 Stat. 1229. 
223 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 11. 
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to become dependent upon specific strategic commodities for which 
the United States lacks a resource base and which are obtained 
mainly from a small number of countries which may choose to restrict 
or cut off the flow of supply. "224 
The National Commission on Supplies and Shortages was estab-
lished in 1974 by an act of Congress which bore that name. 225 The 
Commission was established after the 1973-1974 oil embargo and 
during a period of widespread shortages of resources and commod-
ities. 226 The Act, for the first time, provided a legislative statement 
about commodity shortages, United States dependency upon foreign 
sources of minerals supply, and vulnerability to supply interrup-
tion. 227 The Commission was to identify and evaluate shortages in 
materials, resources, or commodities,228 and report on existing gov-
ernmental policies affecting supply229 and economic stockpiling230 of 
natural resources. The Commission was also to develop an infor-
mation system for examining and predicting shortages and to deter-
mine what institutional adjustments were needed to analyze the 
economic needs for resources on a permanent basis. 231 The Commis-
sion's report concluded that the most likely threat to supply inter-
ruption in the next quarter century was not from foreign embargoes 
or cartel formation but from military conflict, regional war, or civil 
disorder. 232 Comprehensive strategic and economic stockpiling of es-
sential resources was the solution proposed. 233 
224 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 36 (quoting NAT'L COMM'N ON MATERIALS 
POLICY, MATERIAL NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT TODAY AND TOMMORROW (1980». 
225 50 U.S.C. app. § 2169(d) (1982). 
226 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 37. See also U.S. MINERALS VULNERA-
BILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 11; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2169(b)(3) (1982). 
227 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 11. In the Act Congress 
finds that: 
(1) The United States is increasingly dependent on the importation from foreign 
nations of certain natural resources vital to commerce and the national defense. 
(2) Nations that export such resources can alone or in association with other nations 
arbitrarily raise the prices of such resources to levels which are unreasonable and 
disruptive of domestic and foreign economies. 
(3) Shortages of resources and commodities are becoming increasingly frequent in 
the United States, and such shortages cause undue inconvenience and expense to 
consumers and a burden on interstate commerce and the Nation's economy. 
50 U.S.C. app. § 2169(b)(1)-(3) (1982). 
228 Id. § 2169(c), (g)(1)-(3). 
229Id. § 2169(g)(4). 
230 I d. § 2169(g)(5). 
231 Id. § 2169(c), (g)(6). 
232 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 38. See also U.S. MINERALS VULNERA-
BILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 11-12. 
233 See CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 38-39. See also 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2169(g)(5) (1982). 
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the studies prepared by 
these commissions. All of the commissions recognized the importance 
of adequate mineral supplies and a strong domestic mining and min-
erals processing industry.234 All support the "least cost principle" 
that foreign imports, because of their cheap cost, provide the great-
est benefits to the consumer.235 At the same time, the commissions 
warned about the foreign policy implications of the United States' 
dependency on mineral imports.236 These commissions recommended 
that the government should improve its analytical capability and 
means of integrating information so that a comprehensive system 
could be developed to analyze the impacts of government policies 
upon the industry and larger national interest.237 The commission 
reports have had no significant impact on government policy for-
mulation, both executive and legislative, "which, out of concern for 
the attainment of other national goals has given little or no priority 
to the Nation's minerals."238 
B. Past Legislative Activity on Minerals Policy 
Despite federal policy restricting mining access to public lands and 
regulating the minerals industries, Congress has recognized the im-
portance of minerals to the nation and passed legislation to support 
domestic mining projects.239 
1. The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 
Congress has long understood that developing and maintaining a 
domestic mining and minerals industry is essential to national se-
234 u.s. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 12. 
235 [d. 
236 [d. 
237 [d. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, INTERIOR PRO-
GRAMS FOR ASSESSING MINERAL RESOURCES ON FEDERAL LANDS NEED IMPROVEMENTS 
AND ACCELERATION (1978); NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, supra 
note 4, at 12-21. In the National Commission on Supplies and Shortages Act of 1974 the 
Congress finds that: 
[1.] Existing institutions do not adequately identify and anticipate such shortages 
and do not adequately monitor, study, and analyze other market adversities involving 
specific industries and specific sectors of the economy. 
[2.] Data with respect to such shortages and adversities is collected in various 
agencies of the Government for various purposes, but is not systematically coordi-
nated and disseminated to the appropriate agencies and to the Congress. 
50 U.S.C. app. § 2169(b)(4H5) (1982). 
238 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 13; see also NEED FOR 
NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING PROCESS, supra note 4, at 4-8. 
239 See CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 57-74. 
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curity and the United States' economy.240 Unti11970, however, leg-
islative and executive programs were individually directed toward 
an aspect of minerals problems, without a unified national mining 
and minerals policy.241 In that year, Congress passed the Mining and 
Minerals Policy Act.242 The Act established a broad overall national 
minerals policy,243 and is considered a landmark in the evolution of 
minerals legislation. 244 The Mining and Minerals Policy Act estab-
lished, as a continuing national policy, the goal of fostering and 
encouraging private enterprise in: (1) the development of an econom-
ically sound and stable domestic mining and minerals industry; (2) 
the orderly and economic development of domestic mineral re-
sources; (3) mining research; and (4) the development of methods to 
dispose of mineral waste and the reclamation of mined land. 245 
The Act neither provided any new authority or funding nor called 
for establishing any organizational mechanism for achieving its ob-
jectives.246 Although the Act established policy for the entire federal 
government, it specifically directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
carry out the policy under existing authority and programs, and to 
make an annual report to the Congress showing the state of domestic 
mining and minerals industries, trends in use and depletion of these 
resources, and recommending legislative programs. 247 
Congress did not expect that the Mining and Minerals Policy Act, 
in and of itself, would be a cure-all for the minerals industry but did 
expect the legislation to focus attention on the industry and the need 
for long-range planning.248 The Act, therefore, is simply a statement 
of fundamental principles and objectives concerning a national min-
erals policy. Congress did not declare that the minerals industry's 
needs were superior to other national policies. Nevertheless, Con-
gress clearly intended that the impacts of other national policies on 
the mining industry be evaluated completely when major federal 
actions are proposed. 249 
240 AN ANALYSIS OF THE u.s. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 68. 
241 [d.; see also U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 13-14. 
242 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982). 
243 H.R. REP. No. 1442, supra note 33, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5792. 
244 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 67. 
245 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1982). 
246 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 68; H.R. REP. No. 
1442, supra note 33, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5795. 
247 30 U. S. C. § 21a (1982). 
248 H.R. REP. No. 1442, supra note 33, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5792, 5793. 
249 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 68; U.S. MINERALS 
VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 14. 
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Congressional expectations in passing the Mining and Minerals 
Policy Act have not been fulfilled. 250 The Department of the Interior 
has been criticized severely for not responding adequately to the 
Congressional directive under the Act.251 During the 1970s, the In-
terior Department did little substantive work to implement a na-
tional materials policy in accordance with the Act.252 The Secretary's 
annual reports "have degenerated to the point of being nearly use-
less. "253 Effective implementation of the Act is also hindered by the 
lack of comprehensive guidelines to identify and balance conflicts 
among national policies, programs, and regulations. 254 
2. The National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and 
Development Act of 1980 
Congress' intent in passing the National Materials and Minerals 
Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980255 was to replace the 
existing ad hoc decisionmaking process with a mechanism to coor-
dinate and implement a coherent national minerals and materials 
policy and program. By doing so, Congress intended to assure the 
availability of materials critical to the United States' economic well-
being, national defense, and industrial production. 256 Congress stated 
that notwithstanding the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 
the United States did not have a coherent national minerals policy. 257 
The 1980 Act called for materials and minerals policymaking and 
analysis to be coordinated through the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident and Cabinet. 258 The 1980 Act directs the President to coordi-
250 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 69. 
251 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 68; U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 16-22. 
252 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 68. A government report stated that 
during the 1970s the Department of the Interior ignored the statutory language and funda-
mental purpose of the Act by abdicating "its assigned role and responsibility" for implementing 
the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970. U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra 
note 19, at 16, 22. 
253 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 18. 
Perhaps no single action by the Department of the Interior illustrates its abdication 
of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 as do the annual reports issued under 
that statutory mandate. [T]he ... reports [have] degenerated into a perfunctory and 
totally unsatisfactory fulfillment of the form but not the substance of the requirements 
of the Act. 
[d. at 19-20. 
254 AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 69-70. 
255 30 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 (1982). 
256 [d. § 1602. See also id. § 1601(a)(6). 
257 [d. § 1601(a)(7). 
258 [d. §§ 1602-1603. 
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nate responsible federal departments and agencies in fully imple-
menting the Act's policies. 259 The Act also directs the President to 
assume certain specific responsibilities, including assessing federal 
policies at all stages of the materials production cycle. 260 It also 
assigns several federal departments and agencies specific responsi-
bilities. 261 
259 [d. § 1602. The Act declares it to be the policy of the United States to promote an 
adequate and stable supply of essential materials, necessary to maintain national security, 
economic well-being, and industrial production. The statement of policy requires that appro-
priate attention be given to achieving a long-term balance between energy needs, a healthy 
environment, natural resources conservation, and social needs. The declaration of policy also 
requires the President to ensure that six actions are taken. First, the President is to insure 
that the Federal Government identifies strategic materials needs and pursues measures that 
would assure the availability of materials critical to commerce and the economy. Second, the 
President shall establish administrative mechanisms for the coordination of federal materials 
programs, including research and development. Third, a capability is to be established to 
provide long-range assessments concerning materials demand, supply and needs and to provide 
the policies and programs necessary to meet those needs. Fourth, a vigorous and comprehen-
sive program of materials research and development is to be carried out. Fifth, cooperative 
research and development programs are to be undertaken with other nations for the equitable 
and frugal use of materials and energy. Sixth, the President shall promote and encourage 
private enterprise and the development of economically sound and stable domestic materials 
industries. Finally, the President is directed to encourage federal agencies to facilitate avail-
ability and development of domestic resources to meet critical materials needs. [d. 
260 [d. § 1603(8). The President shall pursue nine activities to implement the policies of the 
Act. First, the President is to assure that federal departments identify and make recommen-
dations for carrying out policies that ensure an adequate materials supply. Second, the Pres-
ident shall support basic and applied research and development for the exploration, discovery, 
and recovery of nonfuel minerals, including recycling, conservation, substitution, and new 
engineering designs. Third, improved methods of collection and dissemination of materials 
information is to be carried out with federal, state and local governments, private industry, 
and universities. Fourth, an assessment of the need for technically trained personnel necessary 
for materials research, development, and industrial practice is to be undertaken. Fifth, an 
early warning system for materials supply problems is to be established. Sixth, the President 
shall recommend to the Congress appropriate measures to promote industrial innovation in 
materials technologies. Seventh, cooperative materials research and problem-solving is to be 
undertaken by private corporations and federal and state institutions having shared interests 
or objectives. Eighth, federal policies shall be assessed which affect all stages of the minerals 
production cycle, including tax policies. Finally, the President is directed to assess the oppor-
tunities for the United States to promote cooperative agreements for mineral development in 
foreign nations. [d. § 1603. 
261 [d. § 1604(b)-{f). The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall 
coordinate federal minerals research activities, and prepare an assessment of national mate-
rials needs. [d. § 1604(b). The Department of Commerce shall submit reports to Congress 
assessing critical materials needs of the United States and recommendations to meet such 
needs. [d. § 1604(c). The Secretary of Defense shall prepare and periodically revise reports 
assessing essential materials needs related to national security, and identify steps to meet 
those needs. [d. § 1604(d). The Secretary of the Interior must initiate actions to improve the 
Bureau of Mines' capacity to assess international mineral supplies and increase the level of 
mineral research by the Bureau of Mines. [d. § 1604(e). The Secretary must also improve the 
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The central purpose of the National Materials and Minerals Policy, 
Research and Development Act of 1980 was to establish a mechanism 
within the Office of the President that could lead to a sound national 
nonfuel minerals and materials policy.262 The President's program 
formally assigned policy coordination responsibility to the Cabinet 
Council on National Resources and the Environment. 263 "The Council 
is to ensure high-level consideration of important minerals and ma-
terials issues on a timely basis with the capability of prompt action 
on such issues by the President. "264 
The Council has not, however, provided the continuous decision 
and policy coordination required by the Act. 265 Instead, the numer-
ous federal departments, agencies, councils, committees, and task 
forces which have been delegated authority for discharging minerals 
policies, have proceeded independently.266 The programs and reports 
that they implement may exacerbate rather than mitigate the prob-
lems associated with the ad hoc coordination that the Act intended 
to replace by multiplying the number of activities that must be 
coordinated. 267 Important actions affecting minerals policy have oc-
curred without the Cabinet Council providing high-level considera-
tion of these actions as required by the Act. 268 Furthermore, the 
availability and analysis of minerals information in federal land use decisionmaking. [d. 
§ 1604(e)(3), (0. 
Within one year of the date of enactment, or on October 21, 1980, the President was to 
submit to Congress a program plan setting forth, inter alia, the institutional changes with 
the Executive Office of the President necessary to implement the Act's policy to promote an 
adequate and stable supply of minerals and materials necessary to maintain national security, 
economic well-being, and industrial production. [d. § 1604(a). 
262 [d. §§ 1602-1603. Congress was hopeful that "elevating the leadership role to the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President should assure that departments and agencies will be permitted 
to exercise their responsibilities with an oversight of decision and policy coordination provided 
by the President." S. REP. No. 937, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4886,4888. 
263 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS POLICY, supra note 
22, at 14. 
264 [d. 
266 [d. at 14-15. 
266 [d. at 15. 
267 [d. 
268 [d. Cabinet Council coordination was not sought by the Department of Defense prior to 
requesting funds in 1982 to subsidize domestic mineral production as authorized by the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS POLICY, supra note 22, at 9. The 
Defense Production Act authorizes loans, loan guarantees, purchases, commitments to pur-
chase, and floor price guarantees to establish or expand domestic minerals production capacity 
and supply. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2091-2093 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Another important materials 
policy issue where the Cabinet Council was not involved was in the preparation of the 
President's fiscal year 1983 budget involving funding for the National Defense Stockpile in 
strategic minerals. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS, supra 
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Cabinet Council lacks the breadth of membership required to for-
mulate national minerals policy.269 "As a result, national minerals 
and materials policy and program planning continues to be primarily 
ad hoc and unstructured. "270 
3. The National Critical Materials Act of 1984 
The Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment has 
handled national materials policy inadequately, and consequently 
hindered the implementation of the National Materials and Minerals 
Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980. Of four reports and 
assessments required by the 1980 Act, only one had been presented 
officially to Congress as of October 1983.271 The Cabinet Council is 
potentially useful as a mechanism to coordinate and implement a 
national materials policy.272 Of great concern, however, is a future 
administration with different executive priorities or organizational 
ideas abolishing the Cabinet Council and returning materials policy 
to the inactive status of the past. 273 
4. Minerals Legislation to Support National Security and Defense 
Congress has stressed through legislation the importance of safe-
guarding the vital nexus between strategic minerals sources and 
note 22, at 10-11. The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-
100a (1982 & Supp. III 1985), provides that a stockpile of strategic and critical materials is to 
be maintained to prevent a dangerous and costly dependence on foreign supply sources during 
national emergencies. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 98b-98e. A third materials policy issue in which the 
Cabinet Council did not participate was the implementation of the President's program plan 
to concentrate federally financed research and development on "long-term, high-risk, high 
potential payoff projects with the best chance of wide ... application to materials problems 
and increased productivity." IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS 
POLICY, supra note 22, at 11-12. Finally, the Cabinet Council was not involved in the 1982 
decision to provide federal support for a $1 billion expansion of a Mexican Copper mining and 
smelting operation that occurred when the United States copper industry was experiencing a 
sharp decline in demand, prices, and profitability. Id. at 12-13. 
269 Id. at 15. Membership in the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources includes the Secretary 
of the Interior as Chairman pro tern, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
Commerce, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Energy. The Vice Presi-
dent, Counselor to the President, and the White House Chief of Staff serve as ex officio 
members. Id. at i. Absent from the Council's membership are sub-cabinet agencies with 
important minerals responsibilities and programs, such as the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency responsible for stockpile policy, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
responsible for environmental regulations affecting the mining industry. Id. at 14. 
270 I d. at 15. 
271 H.R. REP. No. 593 Part I, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS, 2230, 2233 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 593]. 
272Id. 
273 H.R. REP. No. 593, supra note 271, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 2233. 
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national security. The Defense Production Act of 1950274 is the only 
statutory mechanism "for insuring that the nation's industrial base 
is kept in a state of readiness in peacetime so that new programs 
may be initiated and standby programs may be expanded in the 
event of mobilization. "275 Title III of the Act authorizes the President 
to guarantee loans and to take other financial measures necessary 
to expand productive capacity and supply in the interest of national 
defense. 276 Title III also authorizes the guaranteed long-term pur-
chases of minerals and materials for government use, and for in-
stalling equipment and facilities in government or privately owned 
plants. 277 
The Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act of 1953278 rein-
forced the Defense Production Act of 1950 by extending its pro-
grams.279 The Act required federal agencies to take steps to decrease 
United States dependency on foreign sources of mineral supplies. 
The Act also 
recognized that the continued dependence on overseas sources 
of supply for strategic or critical minerals and metals during 
periods of threatening world conflict or of political instability 
within those nations controlling the sources of supply of such 
materials gravely endangers the present and future economy 
and security of the United States. 280 
The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 
1979281 provides for the acquisition and retention of stocks of certain 
strategic and critical materials in order to preclude a dangerous and 
costly dependence by the United States upon foreign sources in times 
of national emergency.282 The strategic and critical materials stock-
pile program is badly outdated.283 It has been nearly thirty years 
since major additions to the stockpiles were last made.284 Filling the 
stockpile to its authorized level would require the purchase of ad-
274 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
275 S. REP. No. 166, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 1743, 1744. 
276 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2091-2092 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
277 I d. § 2093. 
278 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2181-2183 (1982). 
279Id. § 2182. 
280 I d. § 2181. 
281 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-100a (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
282Id. § 98a(b). 
283 S. REP. No. 201, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 793, 794 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 201]. 
284 Id., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, at 794. 
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ditional materials at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. 285 Further-
more, successive administrations have reoriented and significantly 
changed stockpile policy in recent years. 286 
C. The Failure to Implement a National Materials Policy 
Despite Congress' professed concern over the United States de-
pendency on foreign minerals,287 achievement of complete United 
States mineral self-sufficiency in the foreseeable future is not 
likely.288 Congressional and administrative policy decisions regarding 
mineral security are often shortsighted and contradictory and may 
vary depending on the government agency involved or the political 
party in power.289 Too often legislative and executive initiatives are 
fragmented and enacted without fully considering their impacts on 
the minerals industries and the industrial production of the United 
States. 290 Congress also has failed to provide oversight to ensure 
285 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS POLICY, supra note 
22, at 10. 
286 S. REP. No. 201, supra note 283, at 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 794. 
287 30 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982); id. § 1801 (Supp. III 1985). 
288 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 83-102. 
289 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at xi-xii. 
290 [d. at 13; see also S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, at 4875. Federal departments and agencies pursue highly fragmented 
mineral activities that reflect departmental rather than national perspectives of minerals 
policy. S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 5-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 4875-76. 
Congress too has played a role in the decline of America's mineral capabilities. 
Because of its fragmented policy process, Congress has failed to provide oversight, 
has not sought to understand how other legislation negatively affects the production 
of minerals, and has failed to check executive initiative oriented only toward other, 
and often conflicting, policy goals. 
U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 13. 
The federal government, when establishing and implementing various energy and environ-
mental policies, has done so without adequately recognizing the potential impacts on materials 
availability and the domestic mining industry. This situation is illustrated by the government's 
imposition of the vehicle fuel-economy standards. The government never evaluated the pos-
sible effects on the supplies and prices of basic materials required in automobile construction 
before adopting the automobile fuel efficiency standards. The standards, enacted to reduce 
United States' dependency upon foreign petroleum imports, may result in increased aluminum 
imports that may exceed the dollar value that can be saved by reducing oil imports. Thus, 
the United States balance-of-trade deficit would not improve. Furthermore, to meet the 
standards, automobile pollution control devices may require more rhodium than is normally 
available and cause a drastic price increase for this scarce metal. UNITED STATES GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, POLICY CONFLICT-ENERGY, ENVIRON-
MENTAL, AND MATERIALS: AUTOMOTIVE FUEL-ECONOMY STANDARDS' IMPLICATION FOR MA-
TERIALS, 13 (1980). 
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that its policies are implemented properly by executive agencies. 291 
Because there is no federal policy-level advocate for minerals, the 
nation's mineral security has become dependent on the political pro-
cess rather than the forces of the free market. 292 
Public land access restrictions, environmental, and health and 
safety regulations, political policy decisions, and administrative de-
lay increase the cost of domestic mineral development and impede 
capitalization of increased mineral production.293 The federal govern-
ment is pursuing a course of action that makes the development of 
a secure domestic mineral supply increasingly difficult if not impos-
sible to achieve. 294 As a result of conflicting federal actions, the 
United States lacks a coherent national materials policy to assure 
the availability of essential materials. 295 
V. MINERALS SUPPLY SECURITY 
The increasing United States dependence on foreign sources for 
strategic and critical materials, and the success of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in both raising prices and 
exerting political pressure, has led to concern over the vulnerability 
of the United States to essential minerals supply interruption. 296 The 
291 u.s. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 13. 
292 See id. at 16, 27. 
293 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197. There are 
four major laws that encourage the development of United States mineral resources. On the 
negative side, there are at least 26 environmental and anti-pollution laws that withdraw land 
from mineral exploration and severely control mining and mineral processing. Id. at 260. 
294 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 27. 
295'30 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(6) (1982). See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS, MINERALS MANAGEMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR NEEDS CO-
ORDINATION AND ORGANIZATION (1981); ACTIONS TO PROMOTE A STABLE SUPPLY OF MIN-
ERALS, supra note 36; IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL MINERALS AND MATERIALS 
POLICY, supra note 22; LEARNING TO LOOK AHEAD, supra note 4; GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, NEED TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL NON-FuEL-MINERAL 
POLICY (1976). 
296 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 84. See also 
Lewin, Washington Window, 103 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 79 (1985). The oil embargo 
emphasized United States dependency on oil imports and the ability of foreign suppliers to 
disrupt a commodity market. This political use of economic resources has paved the way for 
attempts at a worldwide economic realignment, based on the control and distribution of all 
natural resources. As the impact of the oil crisis on the American economy deepened, concern 
grew as to the continued availability of the nation's imports of other minerals necessary for a 
highly industrialized society. Plotkin, The United States and South Africa: The Strategic 
Connection, 85 CURRENT HIST. 201 (1986). 
There are essential differences between nonfuel minerals and oil. First, minerals are cheaper 
and are used in far smaller quantities per unit of final output than oil, and, therefore, are 
easier to stockpile. Shafer, supra note 81, at 155-56. It is not practicable for the United States 
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United States vulnerability to materials supply interruption is a 
post-World War II problem. 297 For its first 150 years, the United 
States was almost totally self-sufficient for its own mineral needs.298 
Since the Second World War, however, three important changes have 
occurred in world politics and trade. 299 The first international change 
was the rapid increase in the rate of metals consumption.30o At 
present consumption rates, mankind will consume more metal in the 
next 25 years than has been consumed to date. 301 The second world 
change was the explosion in technology that increased demand for 
metals over that required by our pre-war standard of living.302 Fi-
nally, worldwide decolonization led to the establishment of new de-
veloping countries that became the owners of mineral deposits and 
realigned the priorities and concerns of the world's mineral supply 
system.303 
Prolonged supply interruption of certain strategic and critical min-
erals would jeopardize the security of the industrialized world. A 
materials industry representative concluded in congressional testi-
mony that curtailing certain vital minerals for six months to one 
year would seriously imperil the Western world or "bring it to its 
knees. "304 
Import dependence, defined as the percentage of demand supplied 
by foreign sources, is not the same as vulnerability to supply inter-
ruption. 305 The stability, reliability, and diversity of foreign sources 
of supply are major factors in determining whether the United States 
is vulnerable to supply disruptions of a particular imported min-
to store an entire year's consumption of oil, but the nation could stockpile a one year reserve 
of strategic minerals. [d. Second, there is no substitute for petroleum as fuel for the combustion 
engine. [d. 
297 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 67 
(statement of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Material and Services, Allegheny International, 
Inc.). 
298 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 5. 
299 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 67 




302 [d. at 68. 
303 [d. 
304 N ONFUEL MINERALS POLICY REVIEW, PART II, supra note 43, at 48, 56. For a discussion 
on United States vulnerability to minerals supply interruptions, see Hazilla & Kopp, Assessing 
U.S. Vulnerability to Raw Material Supply Disruptions: An Application to Nonfuel Miner-
als, 51 S. ECON. J. 341 (1984). 
305 See TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 83. 
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eral. 306 The majority of United States minerals imports come from 
reliable sources, either allies or close neighbors. For a few specific 
minerals, however, the United States is highly dependent on a lim-
ited number of potentially unstable foreign sources. Domestic strikes 
can interrupt supplies even from sources regarded as reliable. Other 
sources, such as imports from Australia, are vulnerable because the 
supply lines are so long.307 This section discusses the major factors 
that affect security of supply, provides examples of materials supply 
interruptions since World War II, and gives a brief analysis of the 
effects of past supply interruptions. 
A. Factors That Affect Security of Supply 
1. Depletion of World Resources 
The depletion of world resources in the face of escalating demand 
is a concern expressed especially during periods of tight supplies and 
high prices, as was the case in the oil embargo of 1973-1974.308 
Resource depletion forecasts, however, do not stand up to close 
scrutiny. Supporters of resource exhaustion theories have not rec-
ognized prices as a motive to increase mineral reserves nor as a 
motive to economize use of material resources, develop substitutes, 
or recycle. 309 Another weakness in scarcity forecasts is that they are 
often based on available proven reserves (reserves are resources 
that can be mined economically at current prices and technology), 
ignoring the continuing development of new reserves. 310 Such pre-
dictions have not recognized that reserves represent available supply 
in the short term and that the long term reserve base is being 
expanded continually through price changes, new deposits discovery, 
and new technology development.3ll For example, through techno-
306 Id. at 48-50, 83. 
307Id. 
308 Murphy, supra note 30, at 192. 
309Id. 
3!0 Id. 
311 Id. See also TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 
84. New mineral deposits are continually adding to the reserve base. For example, a minerals 
engineer claims to have discovered a substantial deposit of rare titanium along a beach near 
the San Francisco zoo. Titanium Find is in "Millions o/Tons", Deseret News, Nov. 24,1986, 
at A5, col. 2. Titanium is a noncorrosive metal used in the construction of weapons and 
aircraft. Id. The largest deposits are found in the Soviet Union and South Africa. Id. The 
United States imports most of its supply from Australia at approximately $30 a pound. Id. at 
A5, col. 3. Government restrictions may impede development of the deposit. "The exploration 
site is on land belonging to the National Park Service and in waters under the jurisdiction of 
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logical advances, many lower quality ores are now "just as usable as 
the richer ones were before them. "312 World reserves, therefore, are 
only the "tip of the iceberg" in comparison with world resources. 313 
The earth's resources are finite and therefore potentially exhaus-
tible. 314 The best available information, however, indicates that there 
are sufficient minerals to meet the world's needs for at least the next 
thirty to fifty years. 315 Many areas of the world have not been 
explored for mineral potential. 316 Substantial mineral resources are 
estimated to exist in the Arctic regions, the Soviet Union, China, 
and Brazil. 317 In addition, the mineral potential of the oceans is 
considerable, particularly for nickel, copper, cobalt, and man-
ganese. 318 
The optimistic longer term minerals supplies outlook does not 
mean that technology can extend the life of the earth's resources 
indefinitely.319 According to one geophysical theory, most metals 
have a "mineralogical barrier" beyond which the energy needed to 
release them from the rocks in which they are bound is so great and 
the prices so high that new supplies of these metals will no longer 
be produced. 320 World resources depletion, however, is not likely in 
State Lands Commission and any extraction operation would require approval by numerous 
state and federal agencies." Id. at A5, col. 4. 
312 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 84. 
313 See Murphy, supra note 30, at 192. 
314 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 84. 
315 Id. See also Murphy, supra note 30, at 192. 
316 Murphy, supra note 30, at 192. 
317Id. 
318 Id.; 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(4) (1982). 
319 Murphy, supra note 30, at 192; see also TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VUL-
NERABILITY, supra note 4, at 84. 
320 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 85. The 
mineralogical barrier may be reached for all but five geochemically scarce metals within a 
century. 
Id. 
The Earth's crust contains just 12 "geochemically abundant" elements, which ac-
count for over 99 percent of the mass. Five of these elements are metals: aluminum, 
iron, magnesium, titanium, and manganese. A steadily increasing amount of energy 
will be needed to produce even these metals from progressively leaner ores. But for 
all the other metals, a mineralogical barrier may exist, usually at ore concentrations 
of about one-tenth to one-hundredth of 1 percent, past which the metal is no longer 
concentrated in an ore body. Instead, it is dispersed as atoms, isomorphically replac-
ing atoms of the abundant elements in common rocks. Once the mineralogical barrier 
is reached, the energy needed to release the scarce metals will be so great, and the 
prices so high, that according to the theory, new supplies of these metals will no 
longer be produced. According to this theory, a "Second Iron Age" will begin when 
"it will be simply cheaper to substitute iron and aluminum and put up with penalities, 
such as lower efficiencies in machines, that we do not now countenance." 
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the physical "running out" of reserves but as a persistent long-term 
rise in materials costS. 321 Although minerals depletion is in fact oc-
curring, the loss at this time is not crucial. 322 As long as fossil fuels 
are abundant, technological advances will bring continued growth in 
the world's minerals reserves. 323 
2. Demand Surges 
Temporary shortages and price increases for materials in response 
to unusual demand surges are infrequent, short-lived, but disruptive 
experiences to the economies of industrialized countries. 324 The prob-
lems of productive capacity are largely the result of market force 
unpredictability and the difficulties in forecasting demand trends. 325 
The recent relatively slow growth in economic activity in the United 
States has produced overcapacity and low prices for many miner-
als. 326 An unexpected and sustained surge in demand, however, could 
outstrip current capacity and lead to supply shortages. 327 Problems 
stemming from such surges could be avoided only by stockpiling the 
materials at substantial cost. 328 The materials may be stored for 
decades before being needed.329 Furthermore, it is impossible to 
project demand trends accurately for the two to seven years needed 
to open new mines, processing plants, and support facilities, and the 
risk of investing in excess capacity is unusually high.330 In the case 
of most commodities, therefore, industries underinvest during pro-
longed periods of low demand, and industries dependent upon the 
minerals may experience supply dislocations during a demand surge 
and resulting inadequate production capacity. 331 
3. Cartels 
In cartels, "producing companies . . . formally agree to control 
production, exports, or selling prices to restrict competition and 
321Id. 
322 Id. 
323 See id. at 84-85. 
324 Murphy, supra note 30, at 192-93; TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNER-
ABILITY, supra note 4, at 5. 





330 Id.; see also TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, 
at 86. 
331 Murphy, supra note 30, at 193; TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABIL-
ITY, supra note 4, at 86. 
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obtain higher export earning."332 The United States' increasing de-
pendence on foreign sources for strategic and critical materials, and 
the success of OPEC in both raising prices and exerting political 
pressure, have led to concern over the vulnerability to the possible 
formation of minerals and materials cartels. 333 
Some of the conditions for a successful minerals cartel exist for 
several nonfuel minerals. There is a limited number of suppliers, and 
some minerals are essential for certain industries and presently have 
no effective substitution. 334 There are, however, several reasons why 
these conditions are not enough to create a successful cartel for most 
nonfuel minerals. First, the total cost of United States nonfuel min-
erals imports, compared with oil, is small. 335 Second, most nonfuel 
minerals are easier to store than oil, enabling users to stockpile the 
commodity.336 Most minerals-using industries store essential miner-
als, and the federal government has a one- to three-year reserve of 
many critical materials to meet national defense needs in an emer-
gency.337 Third, markets for most nonfuel minerals have been de-
pressed since the mid-1970s. 338 Fourth, many producer countries are 
dependent on foreign exchange earnings from minerals exports.339 
Finally, and most importantly, producer countries as diverse in ide-
ology and goals as Zimbabwe, South Africa, and the Soviet Union 
do not share a similarity of political objectives and economic condi-
tions to cooperate in a cohesive organization that sets production 
controls and prices. 340 
Producers of copper and bauxite organized a cartel to restrict 
supply and raise prices in 1974 and 1975. The effort to monopolize 
copper production undertaken by members of the International 
Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) was a failure. 341 
:1.12 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 86. 







340 [d. at 86-87; see also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 145-48; Shafer, 
supra note 81, at 160-6l. 
341 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 87. There 
are numerous limits on the potential for an effective copper cartel. CONGRESSIONAL HAND-
BOOK, supra note 18, at 150-52. First, a large number of copper producers exist. [d. at 15l. 
Second, the CIPEC countries are highly dependent on foreign trade revenues from copper. 
[d. Third, copper resources are widely distributed throughout the world. [d. Fourth, other 
materials may be substituted for copper. [d. at 152. Finally, CIPEC included diverse nations-
Chile, Zambia, Zaire and Peru-who lacked the necessary cohesion for a successful cartel. [d. 
at 150, 152. 
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Efforts to increase prices by the International Bauxite Association 
(IBA) were more successful. Most members increased their bauxite 
exports earnings by over 200 percent during 1974 and 1975.342 Ja-
maica's imposition of sharply higher bauxite exports taxes was par-
ticularly successful. 343 The tax was successful because United States' 
aluminum producers had no alternative supplier as convenient as 
nearby Jamaica, and the cost of bauxite is a small fraction of the 
cost of aluminum. 344 
The fact that minerals cartels have failed in the past does not mean 
that they will not succeed in the future. Factors impeding successful 
cartel formation are the lack of common goals among producing 
countries, the existence of stockpiles and substitutes, and the threat 
of new, alternate sources of supply.345 One of the classic conditions 
for monopoly control exists for some significant nonfuel minerals-
the fact that a few important minerals are produced by a limited 
number of supplier nations.346 Chromium, manganese, cobalt, and 
platinum group metals have the potential for cartel formation be: 
cause the United States is import dependent on these metals and 
production is concentrated in southern Africa and the Soviet 
Union. 347 
4. Political Embargoes 
Increased control over natural resources is becoming a major ob-
jective of developing countries in their efforts to gain a worldwide 
economic realignment between industrialized and developing coun-
tries. Developing nations seek to transform the industrialized coun-
tries dependence on imported raw materials into higher commodity 
prices and enhanced political influence on international affairs. 348 This 
transformation creates "a 'new international economic order ... " 
in which some mineral-producing countries have nationalized foreign 
mineral interest and have threatened to deny raw materials if their 
economic and social demands are not met. "349 South African govern-
ment officials, including President P. W. Botha, have suggested sev-
eral times that if the international community imposed severe sanc-
342 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 153. 
343 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 87. 
344 [d. 
345 [d. 
346 [d. at 86-87. 
347 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 160-63. 
348 Murphy, supra note 30, at 193. 
349 Hearings on the U.S. Stake in the Global Economy, supra note 3, at 16. 
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tions against South Africa, the country might retaliate by 
withholding mineral supplies from the world market. 350 Govern-
ments, including the United States, limit world trade in minerals to 
advance political objectives. 351 From 1966 to 1971, the United States 
supported United Nations sanctions against the former British col-
ony of Rhodesia and imposed a boycott of Rhodesian chrome because 
the country refused to grant blacks equal participation in its gov-
ernment. 352 Since the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, the United 
States has also prohibited imports of nickel and other materials from 
that country as well. 353 
Nevertheless, excluding boycotts adopted by the United States, 
embargoes of raw materials are unlikely because producing countries 
depend too heavily on revenue from their mineral exports to endan-
ger that income by imposing an embargo.354 Embargoes are coun-
terproductive to producers' revenue goals because they deny the 
commodity but do not increase revenue. 355 An embargo, however, 
may be undertaken for political reasons such as the Arab oil embargo 
of 1973-1974.356 If a politically motivated embargo is to be successful, 
the producing countries must have common political objectives and 
economic power.357 This combination of factors is only present in the 
Arab OPEC countries and is not found in any other group of coun-
tries producing nonfuel minerals. 358 
5. The Resource War 
Nations and kingdoms have sent explorers, generals, and coloniz-
ers to discover, conquer, and exploit the mineral rich regions of the 
globe. 359 "For most of the 20th century access to raw materials has 
360 Willenson & Getz, The Mines of Apartheid: Can the West do Without South Africa's 
Minerals?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1986, at 30; see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH 
AFRICA 10 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON 
SOUTH AFRICA]. 
361 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 87. 
362 [d. 
363 [d. 
354 Murphy, supra note 30, at 193; see Don't Lose Sleep Over Strategic Metals, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 30, 1985, at 23 [hereinafter Don't Lose Sleep]. "Mining accounts for about 26% of South 
Africa's gross domestic product and 75% of its foreign exchange earnings .... " [d. 




369 Earney, The Geopolitics of Minerals, 31 Focus 1 (1981). 
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been associated with wars and military conflict. "360 One commentator 
has suggested that the origins of the past two world wars may be 
traced in part to the dearth of natural resources available to the axis 
powers.361 Certainly numerous military decisions in World War II 
were based on the need to acquire or to deny access to various 
mineral resources. 362 Today, geopolitical situations exist in which 
minerals are the focus of conflict.363 Some analysts claim that a 
360 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 80 
(statement of Dr. Daniell. Fine, Research Associate, Mining and Materials Resource Research 
Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). See also Kemp, Scarcity and Strategy, 56 
FOREIGN AFF. 396 (1978). 
361 A. ECKES, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR MINERALS 3-25, 57-
87, 89-119 (1979). 
The acquisition of alternate sources of raw materials played a part in initiating World War 
1. German historian Fritz Fischer writes that his country's decision to enter the first global 
war was a desperate attempt to achieve a world position equal to that of Britain or France. 
He maintains that German war aims included the acquisition of specific raw material sources-
possession of iron from French Lorraine; iron, coal, and manganese from the Ukraine; and 
other resources from Belgium, Turkey, and African colonies. See id. at 3-35. 
Similarly, there is a link between mineral deficiencies in the Axis nations of Germany, Japan, 
and Italy in World War II. [d. at 58-59, 260. In the prewar period, these nations repeatedly 
asserted that the uneven distribution of raw materials among industrial states was inequitable 
and intolerable. [d. As late as 1939, Britain and the United States controlled over 75% of all 
mineral resources, while the dissatisfied Axis powers held only 11%. [d. Facing increased 
popUlation growth and domestic demands for higher living standards, the three countries 
concluded that war was an acceptable alternative to acquire needed sources of raw materials 
and achieve lasting economic growth. See id. at 57-87, 89-119. 
A secure supply of minerals resources is so important that an argument was made in 1943 
to the effect that the combined mineral resources of the British Empire and the United States, 
together with control of the sea and air, was the basis for collective action to prevent future 
wars in the post World War II era. Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, 
supra note 197, at 80 (statement of Dr. Daniell. Fine, Research Associate, Mining and 
Minerals Resource Research Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
362 A. ECKES, supra note 361; Dumett, Africa's Strategic Minerals During the Second World 
War, 26 J. AFRICAN HIST. 381 (1985). 
One important cause of the Second World War was the competition for control of the world's 
strategic minerals. Dumett, supra, at 381. To wage total war required the extraction of raw 
materials from all continents on an unprecedented scale. [d. The early success of Axis offen-
sives, which were influenced by the drive to control mineral reserves, produced great concern 
among the Allies. [d. Control over world resources was an important element of the Allied 
plan for victory. [d. Since the Germans dominated continental Europe, the Allies had to meet 
their raw material requirements from Africa and other regions of the world. [d. Africa's 
minerals were used in Allied rearmament and wartime munitions production and were signif-
icantly more important than the continent's political position and general level of economic 
development. [d. at 381-82. "Indeed, it is possible to argue, because of its dominance in the 
supply of certain critical minerals, that African production was absolutely essential for the 
Allied war effort." [d. at 382. 
363 Russett, Security and the Resources Scramble: Will 1984 Be Like 1914?, 58 INT'L AFF. 
42 (1981-82). Just as assured access to raw materials was a driving force in the outbreak of 
the First and Second World Wars, present-day international conflict could result from attempts 
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"resource war" is being waged by the Soviet Union to gain control 
of both Mideastern oil and southern African minerals, and to 
threaten the United States and its allies with the loss of these critical 
materials. 364 
Although the term "resource war" is used rather loosely by ex-
perts discussing Soviet objectives, it has been described as "the 
acquisition of vital resources by noneconomic means; ... a pernicious 
form of 'economic cannibalism,' designed to destroy the process of 
economic activity outside the Soviet bloc. "365 It is "a strategy of 
confrontation that extends beyond economic competition, but which 
falls just short of conventional military conflict. "366 "Resource war" 
also refers to the economic deployment of Soviet Union mineral 
resources. 367 In 1982, the Soviet Union "dumped" (sold below cost) 
substantial amounts of nickel into depressed world nickel markets. 368 
Canada, a major nickel producer, lost the Western nickel market to 
Soviet exports, thereby creating economic hardship in Canada's min-
ing regions as mines closed and thousands of miners were laid off. 369 
Private industry cannot afford to sell its product below cost for a 
long-term period. 370 A nation, however, can absorb such losses to 
achieve political objectives. 371 Frank Shakespeare, former director 
of the United States Information Agency, has stated: "When we [the 
United States] jostle with Western Europe and Japan for strategic 
minerals-that's competition. When the Russians get into the act-
that's war."372 
to acquire or maintain secure sources of raw materials. I d. at 48. The creation of the American 
Rapid Deployment Force was a direct response to a perceived need to protect Persian Gulf 
oil supplies, which are vital to the economic and security interests of the Western industrialized 
world.Id. 
364 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 41,87. 
365 NONFUEL MINERALS POLICY REVIEW, PART III, supra note 15, at 1 (remarks of Rep. 
James Santini, Nev.). 
366 Id. American dependence on raw materials imported by ship has enhanced the United 
States Navy's role as guardian of the world's maritime trade routes. Klare, Resource Wars, 
HARPER'S, Jan. 1981, at 20-23. The Navy has advocated an unlimited expansion program to 
meet the challenge of likely resource wars. Id. A proposed Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean to 
protect I·ersian Gulf oil supplies is currently being discussed. Id. For additional discussion on 
resource scarcity and international conflict, see P. CONNELLY & R. PERLMAN, THE POLITICS 
OF SCARCITY: RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1975). 
367 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 84 
(statement of Dr. DanielL Fine, Research Associate, Mining and Mineral Resource Research 





372 Meyer, Russia's Sudden Reach for Raw Materials, FORTUNE, July 28,1980, at 43,44. 
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Evidence of Soviet intent to wage a "resource war" lies in political 
statements by Soviet leaders, and Soviet projection of military 
power around the world that could disrupt supplies of vital raw 
materials to the United States and its allies. 373 In 1972, the late 
Leonid Brezhnev said while visiting Somalia: "Our aim is to get 
control of the two great treasure houses on which the West so vitally 
depends, the energy treasury house of the Persian Gulf and the 
mineral treasury house of Central and Southern Africa. "374 Some 
argue that the Soviet military presence indicates a clear intent to 
gain control over Persian Gulf petroleum and southern Africa's min-
eral resources. 375 The virtual encirclement of the Persian Gulf and 
southern Africa by countries either dominated by or leaning to the 
Soviet Union supports this argument. 376 This argument points to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet influence and the presence of 
Cuban and East German troops and advisors in Angola and other 
African nations, and the expansion of the Soviet navy as elements 
of the strategy. 377 
Direct parallels also exist in the Caribbean, through which a large 
portion of United States and critical materials are shipped. President 
Reagan has warned about the spread of Marxist influence from Cuba 
and Nicaragua to El Salvador, Guatemala, and ultimately Mexico. 
Long-term Soviet objectives include Soviet influence over Mexican 
373 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 9 (state-
ment of Sen. John W. Warner, Virginia). 
374 Id. at 69 (statement of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Material and Services, Allegheny 
International, Inc.). Mr. Brezhnev was not the first leader in the Soviet hierarchy to state 
that Soviet policy includes getting control of the raw materials on which the West depends. 
Id. Joseph Stalin made similar statements. Id. In 1921, Stalin said: "That victory over the 
United States and Europe would be facilitated by uprisings in the Middle East and Africa 
which would deprive the 'imperialist' from essential raw materials." Id. In 1957, Major General 
Lagovsky supported this objective when he stated: "The policy should be to link the Middle 
East and Central and Southern Africa into one single, super theater of peaceful warfare so 
that they might obstruct the West from access to both the oil and strategic metals of the 
areas." Id. 
375Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. John W. Warner, Virginia). 
376Id. at 69 (statement of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Material and Services, Allegheny 
International, Inc.). 
377 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 87; Hearings 
on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 253. The Soviets and 
their East German and Cuban surrogates have approximately 44,000 military personnel en-
circling or within southern Africa and about 8,000 troops and advisors in the Mideast and 
North African regions. Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra 
note 197, at 5 (statement of Sen. James A. McClure, Idaho). Soviet supported military 
interventions have already occurred in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zaire. Id. at 253. 
A Marxist-oriented government is in power in Zimbabwe, and covert or subversive Soviet 
operations exist in Namibia, South Africa, and Zaire's Shaba Province. Id. 
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and Venezuelan oil shipments, strategic Caribbean sea lanes, and 
the Panama Canal. 378 
The "resource war" argument encompasses a second scenario. 379 
Soviet critical materials exports are declining sharply, and the Soviet 
Union has begun to import strategic minerals for itself and its al-
lies. 380 According to this scenario, "the Soviet Union plans to rely 
on political and military domination of Africa rather than on costly 
economic competition with Western nations to get the resources it 
needs. "381 
Although the Soviet Union may see benefits in controlling these 
resources, some analysts do not believe that Soviet activities in 
Africa are part of a grand design to obtain minerals for themselves 
and deny resources to the West. 382 These observers maintain that 
"a scenario in which the Soviets used direct force in South Africa or 
elsewhere in southern Africa to cut off minerals production or in 
which they interdicted shipping from the region would almost cer-
tainly take place in the context of much larger hostilities. "383 Such 
hostilities would almost certainly involve the interruption of petro-
leum from the Persian Gulf which is closer to the Soviet Union and 
its military power. Furthermore, Mideast oil supply interruption 
would be more devastating to the West than the loss of the strategic 
minerals produced in South Africa. Therefore, these observers ar-
gue, unilateral Soviet military action to cut off mineral exports from 
southern Africa to the West is not as likely as the Soviet use of force 
to disrupt Mideast oil that is nearby and is the West's lifeblood. 384 
Even if there were a Marxist takeover in South Africa, moreover, 
there is little evidence that Marxist states will give up the foreign 
378 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 253. 
379 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 88. 
380 s. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 4873. The quality of Soviet mineral ores have declined and new minerals exploration 
has moved into the forbidding Siberian environment. TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT 
VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 90. 
381 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 88. Some 
observers disagree with the conclusion that the Soviet Union is rapidly increasing its depen-
dence on imports of strategic minerals. [d. at 89-90. They believe that recent Soviet imports 
for some minerals and the cessation of the sale of others are the "consequences of poor Soviet 
planning, shoddy maintenance of facilities, and low production efficiency," and do not signify 
a minerals shortage that could result in a resource war. [d. 
382 [d. at 88; Shafer, supra note 81, at 159; Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical 
Materials, supra note 197, at 92 (statement of Leonard L. Fischman, President, Economic 
Associates, Inc.). 
383 A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 7. 
384 [d.; TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 88. 
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exchange they derive from minerals exports for foreign policy rea-
sons. For example, in Marxist Angola, Cuban troops guard oil in-
stallations in the Cabinda Province, where oil flows from Angola to 
the Western world. 385 
Nevertheless, analysts believe that by direct military interven-
tion, support of Marxist governments and insurgent movements, or 
by fomenting instability, the Soviet Union is positioning itself so that 
it could deny the critical minerals supply from southern Africa to 
the United States and its allies. 386 The Soviet Union is far more self-
sufficient in essential minerals supplies than is the West. 387 An em-
385 A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 8; 
see also TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 88; 
Shafer, supra note 81, at 159-60. Despite Marxist rhetoric, there are numerous examples of 
Communist nations exporting their mineral resources to the West. A REPORT ON U.S. MIN-
ERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 8. This includes exports of East 
European coal, Soviet gas, and Chilean copper under the Allende government. Cuba would 
willingly export its nickel to the United States if it was not prevented by the American trade 
embargo with that country. Id. 
386 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 253. 
There is evidence to support the position that a Marxist takeover of South Africa could 
jeopardize the West's supply of minerals on foreign policy grounds. A REPORT ON U.S. 
MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 7-8. A Marxist South African 
government may embargo supplies in concert with the Soviet Union, the other major source 
of several critical minerals, in order to support a Soviet foreign policy objective that they 
share. I d. There is certainly ample experience of such supply disruption when the Arab states 
pursued a common foreign policy goal and embargoed petroleum exports to the United States 
to force a change in American policy favoring Israel in the Mideast conflict. Id. at 8. Fur-
thermore, revolutionary governments may mismanage their mineral resources and cause 
breakdowns in mine production, or frighten off foreign investment and skilled labor by imple-
menting misguided commercial policies that lack incentives to attract foreign capital and skilled 
workers. Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 93 
(statement of Leonard L. Fischman, President, Economic Associates, Inc.). 
The more likely danger from Soviet influence will be the result of South African support of 
insurgent movements in neighboring black states-Zambia, Angola, and Mozambique-and 
South Africa's failure to undergo a transition from white to black rule. TECHNOLOGIES TO 
REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 88. The danger is that to defend 
themselves from the insurgents and to provide aid to opposition groups in South Africa, these 
nations might become increasingly dependent on Soviet military assistance and might then be 
forced into a subservient client-state relationship. Id.; Sparks, Harare Stepping up Rebel 
Fight, The Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1986, at A21, col. 1. 
387 S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 4873. The United States is self-sufficient in only 5 of the 27 non-fuel minerals 
generally considered to be strategic. The Soviet Union is self-sufficient in 21 of 27 such 
strategic minerals. Sagebrush Rebellion Hearing, supra note 122, at 147 (statement of Dean 
William Dresher, College of Mines, University of Arizona, and Director, State of Arizona, 
Bureau of Geology and Mining Technology). A more serious problem is the far greater 
dependence of United States allies upon supplies of foreign raw materials. In 1980, Western 
Europe imported about 80% of its mineral needs and Japan imported about 95% of its mineral 
needs. Calingaert, U.S. Strategic Minerals Dependency, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 23 (Apr. 
1981); see also Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, 
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bargo of southern African minerals could put the United States and 
its allies in an even more vulnerable position with regard to the 
world's strategic minerals access. 388 "Without adequate and depend-
able mineral supplies ... the free world would be jeopardized. "389 
The United States imports $1.4 billion worth of four critical min-
erals-chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals-each 
year.390 The United States depends on southern Africa's minerals for 
fifty-five percent of its chromium, fifty-three percent of its man-
ganese, fifty-three percent of its platinum group metals, fifty-five 
percent of its vandium, and fifty-five percent of its cobalt. 391 There-
fore, "[a] long-term cutoff of any or all of these materials has the 
potential for an economic and strategic disaster worse than the oil 
crisis of the 1970s. "392 The embargo of South African minerals to the 
United States would affect 3.2 million American jobs in the steel, 
aerospace, and petroleum industries. 393 
6. Civil Disturbances, Local Wars, and Internal Troubles 
Civil disorder, insurrection, invasion, labor strikes, sabotage, and 
terrorism, in the past, have threatened the security of minerals 
supply from southern Africa. Most analysts believe that these dis-
turbances are the greatest threats to a dependable supply of minerals 
exports to the West in the foreseeable future. 394 The threat to trans-
portation interruption is another problem affecting southern Africa's 
minerals security.395 Minerals produced in central and southern Af-
rican nations such as Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are shipped by 
at 4 (statement of Sen. James A. McClure, Idaho). "This vulnerability of Western Europe and 
Japan is the greatest strategic minerals threat facing America." Shafer, supra note 81, at 163. 
388 S. REP. No. 897, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS, at 4873. 
389 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. 
390 England & Gertz, Metals More Precious Than Diarrwnds, Washington Times, Sept. 30, 
1985, at 52, 54. 
391 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 5 (state-
ment of Sen. James A. McClure, Idaho); Don't Lose Sleep, supra note 354. 
392 Hearings on Nat'l Critical Materials Act, supra note 3, at 83 (remarks of Rep. George 
E. Brown, Jr., California). 
393 England & Gertz, supra note 390, at 54. 
394 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 90; see also 
Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 71 (statement 
of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Material and Services, Allegheny International, Inc.). 
395 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 71 
(statement of E.F. Andrews, Vice President, Material and Services, Allegheny International, 
Inc.). 
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rail to South African portS.396 In fact, the supply of Zairian cobalt 
has been threatened by insurrection. Zaire's mineral rich Shaba 
province was occupied briefly by rebel forces in 1978 with serious 
consequences for the world cobalt market. 397 
South African society is in a state of civil disorder as the govern-
ment resists pressure for dismantling the system of apartheid and 
moving from white minority rule to black rule. 398 This civil disorder 
has already caused an increased number of strikes, protesting social 
conditions rather than employment problems, incidents of terrorism 
by groups operating under the loose organization of the African 
National Congress, and spontaneous mass violence. 399 White or black 
protest over South African political policies and social conditions 
could result in increased strike activity or industrial sabotage, either 
of which would slow minerals production. 400 
In addition to labor unrest, minerals production could also be 
interrupted by increased acts of terrorism in South Africa. Terrorist 
acts can have an impact on the mining and minerals processing sector 
either by being targeted as a highly visible and important sector of 
the economy or by triggering the exodus of trained white profes-
sionals. 401 The 1980 attack on South Africa's synthetic oil project 
indicates that economic targets are vulnerable to terrorism. 402 
While labor unrest or internal violence could have short-term 
disruptive effects on South Africa's ability to produce and supply 
strategic minerals to the West, a major social breakdown could 
produce a long-term supply interruption or a decrease in produc-
tion. 403 South Africa is on the edge of a major social upheaval with 
profoundly disruptive effects on mineral supplies. The National 
Party government, in power since 1948, supports the continuation 
of apartheid and the homelands policy, both of which are repugnant 
to the majority black population. One white South African business 
leader has remarked about the failure of government policy: "The 
396 Hearings on Nat'l Critical Materials Act, supra note 3, at 83 (remarks of Rep. George 
E. Brown, Jr., California); TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra 
note 4, at 90. 
397 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 90. 
398 Id.; A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 
11-12. 
399 A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 11-
12. 
400 I d. at 12-13. 
401 I d. at 13. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. at 14. 
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government mistakenly believes that it can have economic integra-
tion with political separation. It cannot work. "404 
Even friendly nations cannot be assumed to be safe and secure 
minerals trading partners. 405 Allies like Canada and Mexico have 
experienced miners' strikes, export restrictions, and minerals indus-
try nationalization that have impacted minerals exports to the 
United States. 406 Nations who freely trade with the United States 
may undergo a change of government, thereby altering their coop-
erative export minerals policies. 407 
B. Materials Supply Interruptions Since World War II 
Since World War II, the United States has had at least four major 
disruptions in the supply of materials critical to the economy and 
the national defense. 408 The first of these occurred in 1949 when, in 
a Cold War exchange of trade restrictions with the United States 
over the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the Soviet Union stopped ex-
porting manganese and chromium ore to the United States. 409 The 
second interruption, from 1966 to 1972, was the United States boy-
cott of chromium from Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, as part of United 
Nations' sanctions against the former British colony's unilateral dec-
laration of independence under a white minority government. 410 The 
third was a 1969 stoppage in the Canadian nickel import as workers 
carried on a prolonged strike. 411 Most recently, a rebel invasion of 
Zaire's mining province, while not actually reducing cobalt produc-
tion, triggered major disruptions in cobalt supplies, inventories, and 
prices. 412 
1. Politically Motivated Embargoes: The Soviet Embargo of 
Manganese and Chromium, 1949, and the United States 
Embargo on Imports of Rhodesian Chromium, 1966-71 
The Soviet Union's embargo on chromium and manganese exports 
to the United States was a Cold War political action between the 
404 Id. 
405Id. 
406 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 253. 
407Id. 
408 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 91-102. 
409 Id. at 91-92. 
410 I d. at 92-94. 
411 I d. at 94-97. 
412Id. at 97-102. 
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two super powers.413 When the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin in 
1948, the United States retaliated by prohibiting Soviet trade of 
industrial goods in the United States. 414 In response to the American 
action, the Soviet Union embargoed all raw materials shipments to 
the United States, including manganese and chromium.415 The Rho-
desian chromium embargo from 1966 to the end of 1971 was another 
politically motivated supply cutoff.416 The boycott was imposed by 
the United States in conformance with a United Nations' resolution 
prohibiting member nations from buying Rhodesian chromium ore 
after Rhodesia declared independence from Great Britain and con-
tinued to govern by white minority rule. 417 The Soviet and Rhodesian 
embargoes did not affect seriously the United States economy or 
defense production. 418 The Soviet embargo, however, could have 
produced serious consequences because, at the time, the Soviets 
were supplying one-third of United States manganese and one-fourth 
of United States chromium. 419 
The United States response in both of these cases was to find 
other foreign sources of supply.420 After the 1949 Soviet embargo, 
the United States actively sought alternative supplies by providing 
mine development loans, sending rail cars to South Africa and steel 
to India to upgrade their respective infrastructure and transporta-
tion systems. 421 The only action taken by the federal government to 
provide industry access to chromium supplies during the United 
States' boycott of Rhodesian chromium was to sell excess chromium 
from the national stockpile. 422 Industry was able to find alternate 
suppliers, and there was no significant supply shortage. 423 Other 
factors, in addition to stockpile sales, eased the effects of the ban on 
Rhodesian imports. The Soviets increased chromium exports to the 
413 [d. at 15, 102. 
414 [d. at 91. 
415 [d. 
416 [d. at 15, 92-93. In 1971, Congress passed legislation removing the ban on United States 
import of Rhodesian chromium. [d. at 93. Members of Congress and the steel industry had 
protested the embargo complaining that it was forcing American steel producers to pay higher 
prices for chromium than their European and Japanese competitors had to pay, and that the 
sanctions against Rhodesia had caused the United States to become dangerously dependent 
on imports of chromium from the Soviet Union. [d. 
417 [d. at 15, 92. 
418 [d. at 15. 
419 [d. at 91. 
420 [d. at 103. 
421 [d. at 91. 
422 [d. at 15. 
423 [d. 
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United States despite the American involvement in the Indo-China 
War against their Vietnamese allies. 424 Second, new suppliers en-
tered the market and other countries increased chromium production 
as prices rose. 425 Finally, the Rhodesian embargo was evaded by 
France, Japan, and Switzerland who resold Rhodesian chromium 
ore. 426 
2. The Canadian Nickel Strike, 1969 
The 1969 Canadian nickel strike closed supplies from a "safe" 
foreign source at a time when Canada was almost the sole United 
States supplier.427 Unlike the politically inspired Soviet and Rhode-
sian embargoes, the Canadian nickel strike caused actual shortages 
and major price increases. 428 The British, also highly dependent on 
Canadian nickel, suffered severe shortages. 429 A British Institute of 
Geological Sciences spokesman referred to the 1969 nickel shortage 
as "perhaps the gravest metal crisis in the United Kingdom since 
the Second World War. "430 The acute nickel shortage and high prices 
that followed the Canadian strikes produced efforts to conserve 
nickel consumption. 431 Users also turned to recycling from scrap and 
substitutions wherever possible. During the strike, prices encour-
aged more nickel production from other countries, and the United 
States released large quantities of the metal from the national stock-
pile. 432 
3. The Cobalt Panic of 1978-79 
In 1977, rebels invaded Zaire's cobalt producing Shaba province 
in an attempt to create the independent state of Katanga. 433 Al-
though there was never any interruption of supply, the combination 
of rapidly rising world demand and fears of a supply cutoff triggered 
panic buying and high prices. 434 The threat of African cobalt supply 
interruption has also surfaced as a result of the Angolan civil war 
424 [d. at 15-16. 
425 [d. at 93. 
426 [d. 
427 [d. at 102. 
428 [d. at 94. 




433 [d. at 98. 
434 [d. at 97. 
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that has closed that country's Benguela railway. The railway was a 
transportation route for shipping metals from Zaire and Zambia. 435 
During the cobalt shortage of 1978-79, cobalt users turned to sub-
stitutes and recycling wherever they could. 436 
C. The Effects of Supply Interruptions 
In none of the four post-World War II supply interruptions did 
the United States suffer long-lasting damage.437 In each case, new 
producers entered the market, thus diversifying the supply, while 
some substitutions and recycling activities were instituted during 
the shortages that have become permanent procedures. 438 Never-
theless, the issue of the United States' dependence on imports of 
critical materials is a major domestic issue. For some materials, 
alternate supplies are not as readily available today as they were in 
previous years. For example, small producers such as India and 
Turkey are not capable of expanding their manganese and chromium 
production to meet United States needs as they did in 1949.439 Fur-
thermore, minerals technology has not changed significantly and 
minerals processing requires the same metals with little chance of 
substantial substitution. 440 
These four diverse historical examples of materials supply inter-
ruptions illustrate four important points. First, supply embargoes 
and interruptions of strategic materials are possible. Second, the 
Canadian nickel strike and the disruption in cobalt markets resulting 
from the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province showed that interrup-
tions in metal supplies could have significant financial effects. Third, 
technology and consumer adjustment in the form of substitutions 
and recycling provided means to respond to supply interruptions in 
each example. 441 Finally, and most importantly, there is no one single 
answer to minerals import vulnerability.442 A government policy for 
strategic materials must include a discussion of the full range of 
possible elements. 443 
435Id. 
436Id. at 97-102. 
437 I d. at 16. 
438 Id. at 103. 




443Id. at 103. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE UNITED STATES IMPORT 
DEPENDENCY AND VULNERABILITY TO SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS 
Assured access to mineral resources at prices established in com-
petitive markets is an important national concern. Resource avail-
ability and the extent to which the United States should rely on 
foreign mineral resources are very complex considerations. It is 
widely recognized that United States' achievement of complete min-
erals and materials self-sufficiency is highly unlikely.444 N everthe-
less, the United States can take suitable steps to reduce import 
vulnerability to a sufficiently low level. Three of these approaches-
substitution, conservation, and increased production-would reduce 
the nation's reliance upon materials imports. The remaining two 
approaches-stockpiling and improved foreign sources of supply-
would not reduce import reliance but would diversify foreign min-
erals supplies and provide sufficient materials to meet emergency 
needs until a supply interruption could be overcome. 445 
A. Stockpiling 
Congress created the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling 
Act to provide a stockpile of vital minerals sufficient to sustain the 
nation for three years in the event of a national emergency.446 Stock-
piling is an effective method to defend against possible supply cut-
offs.447 The nation's present strategic stockpile, however, is inade-
quate. 448 Current supplies are only at forty-eight percent of existing 
targets, with an overabundance of some minerals while others are 
nonexistent. 449 At current funding levels, it will take over sixty years 
to fill the stockpile with the necessary amounts of minerals. 450 The 
444 [d. at 105. 
445 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 229. 
446 Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 U.S.C. § 98b (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). At present, there are 93 strategic minerals in the stockpile values at $13 billion stored 
in 116 locations throughout the country. Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical 
Minerals, supra note 197, at 259. These stockpiles include supplies for the first-tier critical 
minerals imported from South Africa-chromium, cobalt, manganese and platinum group 
metals. A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 
15. 
447 Plotkin, supra note 296, at 203. 
448 See Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 259; 
see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, THE STRATEGIC AND 
CRITICAL MATERIALS STOCKPILE WILL BE DEFICIENT FOR MANY YEARS 5 (1978); McClure, 
Stockpiling of Strategic and Critical Materials, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 417 (1983). 
449 Hearings on Geopolitics and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 259. 
450 [d. at 6 (statement of Sen. James A. McClure, Idaho). 
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federal government would have to invest about $6 billion to raise 
the stockpile to the three-year defense goals. 451 It has been thirty 
years since significant purchases have been made for the national 
stockpile. 452 Additionally, Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan 
have sold minerals from the stockpile in efforts to balance the federal 
budget. 453 
It is in the national interest to maintain a fully supplied strategic 
stockpile. 454 Therefore, a new policy should begin with adequate 
funds from Congress and executive support for an effective stock-
pile. 455 Furthermore, the stockpile legislation should be revised. 456 
Current law provides that stocks can be released by Presidential 
order for national defense purposes during a time of war declared 
by Congress, or national emergency. The law also states that stocks 
cannot be released for general economic or budgetary purposes. 457 
The use of the stockpile in a period of national emergency such as a 
conventional war is the least likely cause of a supply interruption. 458 
The government stockpile system is also too cumbersome to cope 
with the diversity of industry's material requirements. 459 The Stock 
Piling Act should therefore be amended to permit using stockpile 
inventories in situations other than war or to create a new stockpile 
intended specifically for such situations. 460 
The federal government should also enact legislation that requires 
major companies to maintain appropriate levels of critical minerals. 
A system of privately held stockpiles would offer several advantages 
by supplementing government inventories. 461 First, private stock-
piles would be available for industry use in situations other than 
war. 462 The government stockpile could, therefore, concentrate on 
451 [d. at 259. 
452 [d. 
453 [d.; England & Gertz, supra note 390, at 55. 
454 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 259. 
Some observers, however, believe that a national stockpile is not that important to the nation's 
security. Meyer, supra note 8, at 68. They point out that the stockpile is predicated on 
providing minerals to fight a three-year conventional war and this seems unlikely in the 
nuclear age. [d. The Vietnam War, however, shows that the United States may become 
involved in a prolonged conventional conflict in the nuclear age. 
455 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 259. 
456 Shafer, supra note 81, at 163-66. 
457 50 U.S.C. §§ 98b(b), 98f(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
458 Shafer, supra note 81, at 163. 
459 [d. at 163-64. 
460 [d. at 164. 
461 [d. 
462 [d. at 165. 
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stockpiling minerals for conventional military conflict.463 Private 
stockpiles, if decentralized, would not require additional government 
bureaucracies to manage them and would be readily available in the 
event of supply disruptions. 464 As users, private industry would have 
the incentive to properly maintain inventories and thereby avoid the 
deterioration and obsolescence that is present in some strategic 
stockpiles. 465 
The federal government must take a number of steps to encourage 
a system of privately held stockpiles. These steps should include 
subsidies for storage and management of the mandatory stockpiles, 
tax relief to allow the companies to write off the capital costs of 
building the stockpiles more rapidly, low-cost loans for stockpile 
purchases, and favorable capital gains tax treatment of profits and 
losses on the mandatory inventories. 466 "A decentralized system of 
privately held, government-subsidized stockpiles would provide 
valuable security against the most likely mineral security threat at 
a far lower cost than alternative strategies. "467 
B. Improved Foreign Sources of Supply 
The United States is likely to be dependent on a few producing 
countries for most of its strategic materials supplies for the foresee-
able future. Actions can be taken to increase the number of countries 
supplying these materials, thus achieving greater supply diversity. 468 
These actions, however, take time to implement. New mining op-
erations can cost $1 billion from exploration to production, with a 
time-consuming process to raise that capital. 469 Moreover, mining 
ventures are long-term enterprises. 47o It takes from two to five years 
to bring a new deposit into production. 471 Therefore, actions taken 
to promote diversity of supplies are not likely to be immediately 
successful in averting the consequences of a supply disruption. 472 
Nevertheless, some policy options to diversify foreign supply sources 
463 See id. at 163. 
464 Id. at 165. 
465 Id. 
466 Id. at 165-66. 
4m Id. at 166. 
463 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 356. 
469Id. 
47°Id. at 357. 
471 Id. 
472 Id. 
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of specific minerals could help reduce overall United States vulner-
ability to a supply disruption. 473 
Increased reliance on relatively secure sources of supply, such as 
Canada, Mexico, and Australia, would reduce risks in minerals im-
port dependence.474 Of the first-tier minerals, prospects for supply 
diversification appear to be best for manganese, which already has 
the most diverse supply.475 Several alternative supply sources also 
exist for chromium, such as expanding production in Turkey and the 
Philippines.476 Cobalt diversification, primarily in the Southwest Pa-
cific, depends to a large extent upon world nickel and copper markets 
because cobalt is usually a by-product of nickel and copper produc-
tion. 477 In the case of platinum group metals, the most promising 
known but non-producing deposit is in the United States. Outside 
the United States prospects for platinum group metal supply div-
ersification will depend on new discoveries rather than on the de-
velopment of known deposits. 478 
Supply diversity requires investment in and construction of new 
or expanded mining and transportation facilities. Furthermore, pri-
vate industry has little motivation to spend its own resources to seek 
new supplies of critical minerals when known reserves in southern 
Africa and deposits in other countries can be mined more easily. 479 
The United States, therefore, must adopt policies to encourage sup-
ply diversity.480 The federal government must devise programs in-
volving a large government subsidy to bring about such diversity on 
an economic basis. Low interest loans and tax write-offs should also 
be available to encourage investment in foreign mining operations.481 
In at least one industrialized country, the government supports min-
eral development projects launched by private firms overseas. 482 In 
Japan, a country deprived of domestic natural resources, overseas 
ventures of sufficient importance to be considered "national projects" 
are backed by low-interest loans to both the country in which the 
project is located and the consortium of Japanese firms involved in 
473 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 301. 
474 [d. at 321-628; see also Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, 
supra note 197, at 265. 
476 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 26,32. 
476 [d. at 20, 32. 
477 [d. at 23. 
478 [d. at 27-28. 
479A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 350, at 17. 
480 [d. 
481 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 328-81, 333--34. 
482 [d. at 330. 
1988] DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS 281 
the project. The government itself serves as the major stockholder 
in the consortium. 483 
In the United States, private industry, and not government, is 
the primary entity responsible for securing mineral supplies from 
foreign sources. The federal government, however, could encourage 
private investment in foreign mining operations "through the dis-
semination of essential information, by facilitating interaction be-
tween private industry and foreign owners, and by the targeting of 
international aid to private and producer-country mining activities 
that are related to strategic minerals. "484 Programs that encourage 
United States investment in mining in economically attractive sites 
overseas should also be continued and perhaps enhanced. Legislation 
extending the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,485 the 
United States government's program to insure American invest-
ments overseas, should be supported. The Reagan administration's 
interest in internationally sponsored insurance programs for over-
seas investment should be implemented. 486 
The most important steps the United States can take to increase 
its security of mineral supplies from foreign sources is in the foreign 
policy area. 487 The United States must establish foreign policies that 
recognize defense and national security interests in relation to the 
continued supply of strategic materials and seek to maintain rela-
tionships with strategic, mineral-rich nations. 488 The United States 
must implement preventive foreign policy actions. United States 
diplomacy should be used to try to prevent international conflicts in 
mineral-producing regions. 489 First, the United States must work 
toward peaceful change in South Africa, including Namibian inde-
pendence. 49o Second, the United States should challenge the Cuban 
and Soviet presence in Angola as part of an overall strategy for 
Cuban-Soviet withdrawa1. 491 The United States should also expand 
its economic development assistance programs to countries with 
483 [d. at 331--32. 
484 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 357. 
485 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1969). 
486 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 357-61. 
487 Shafer, supra note 81, at 168. 
488 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 265; see 
also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 335--39. 
489 Shafer, supra note 81, at 168; A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH 
AFRICA, supra note 350, at 18-19. 
490 Shafer, supra note 81, at 171; A REPORT ON U.S. MINERALS DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH 
AFRICA, supra note 350, at 18-19. 
491 Shafer, supra note 81, at 171. 
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strategic minerals that are important to the American economy and 
national defense. 492 The United States should also strengthen its 
military capabilities in the event such intervention is needed as a 
"last resort" to prevent a serious interruption of critical minerals. 49:3 
C. Substitution 
Substitution of materials that are relatively plentiful and noncrit-
ical for those that are imported is one of the most attractive ap-
proaches for a long-term solution to reducing United States mineral 
import dependency.494 In this vein, "[s]ome experts have predicted 
that the world may be entering an 'Age of Substitutability' in which 
the technical problems of substitution will have been sufficiently 
solved to permit virtually unlimited interchangeability of materi-
als."495 There are two broad classes of substitute materials: advanced 
materials and direct substitutes. 496 Advanced materials, sometimes 
referred to as economic substitutes, eventually may displace cur-
rently used materials because the new material offers performance, 
cost, or other advantages. 497 In contrast, direct substitutes, some-
times referred to as emergency substitutes, are materials that are 
not preferred but could replace materials used currently during an 
emergency. 498 
To be effective, substitute materials must meet four criteria. First, 
the material must be available domestically or available from reliable 
sources.499 Second, the substitute material must be equal in perfor-
mance to the old material. 500 Third, the new material must have 
demonstrated properties.50l Finally, processing and fabrication of the 
substitute material must be accomplished with little design changes 
for use. 502 Currently there is a great deal of interest in the devel-
opment of advanced materials such as ceramics, composites (combi-
nations of two or more materials), and unconventional metallic ma-
terials that have properties suggesting that they might serve as 
492 [d. at 168-69. 
493 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 339-40. 
494 [d. at 250. 
495 [d. 
496 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 362. 
497 [d. 
498 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 252; TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. 
IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 362. 
499 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 256. 
500 [d. 
501 [d. 
502 CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 256; see also TECHNOLOGIES TO REDCCE 
U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 265-66. 
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substitutes for conventional materials requiring strategic metals. 503 
This interest is the result of the diversity of properties these new 
materials offer.504 They not only offer enhanced properties but often 
present entirely new combinations of properties that may provide 
the basis for important new United States industries. 505 Further-
more, advanced materials use little or reduced amounts of first-tier 
minerals, and over the long term, they will displace or reduce some 
strategic material requirements. 506 
Substitution offers considerable potential to reduce United States 
materials import vulnerability with respect to chromium, cobalt and 
platinum group metals. Because of the satisfactory performance, 
however, reasonable cost, and familiarity of chromium, cobalt, and 
platinum group metals, there has been little interest in developing, 
testing, certifying, or using substitutes. 507 There is little chance, 
however, that a substitute for chromium in stainless steel produc-
tion, which accounts for one-half of the total United States chromium 
demand, will be found. 508 Furthermore, the outlook for substitution 
of platinum group metals in catalytic applications is dim.509 Most 
manganese consumption is in steelmaking, and in this application 
there is currently no satisfactory alternative. 510 
The development of substitute materials is very costly511 and the 
federal government must playa primary role in sponsoring research 
on advanced materials. 512 Government support of research and de-
velopment with regard to advanced materials should be increased. 
Japan, Great Britain, and some Western European countries are 
placing more emphasis than the United States in research and de-
50' TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE u.s. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 285. 
504 /.1. 
505 [d. 
506 [d. at 285, 368. Advanced ceramic materials and composites, defined as the combir.ation 
of two or more materials, yield a product with high strength and stiffness, low weight, and 
good corrosion and chemical resistance. [d. at 286, 301. Despite the potential for substitution, 
advanced ceramic materials and composites will not substantially displace first-tier strategic 
materials within the next decade. [d. at 286,302. Ceramic materials are too brittle to withstand 
the stresses of most system designs. [d. at 286. The high cost of advanced composite materials 
deters their widespread use. [d. at 303. Nevertheless, advanced ceramics may become an 
international business with markets reaching over $20 billion by the year 2000. [d. at 368. 
And advanced composites will be used increasingly in the transportation and aerospace in-
dustries. [d. at 310-12. 
507 [d. at 21-22, 25, 28, 268-84; CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 258-61. 
50H TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 21-23. 
509 [d. at 28. 
510 [d. at 27; CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 260. 
511 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 263. 
512 [d. at 362-[j3, 369-70. 
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velopment activities of alternative materials. 513 Materials research 
activities, however, "are fragmented, without focus, and suffer from 
lack of coordination. "514 The federal government must improve the 
management and coordination of federal materials research efforts 
if the national materials policies goals are to be achieved. 515 In ad-
dition to supporting the development of advanced materials through 
research programs, the federal government can reduce United 
States dependency on foreign imports by making information about 
substitutes widely available to consumers and by developing, test-
ing, and certifying new materials. 516 
D. Conservation 
Past experience has demonstrated that conservation may be an 
important response to critical materials and minerals shortages. In 
all of the post-World War II supply disturbances discussed in this 
Article, industry responded with increased conservation efforts. 517 
Variations of conservation offer ways to reduce United States de-
pendence on foreign strategic materials sources. Recycling, product 
life extension, trimming of alloy additions to the low side of accept-
able ranges, and improved processing techniques are all potentially 
effective in reducing dependence. 518 
In the case of manganese, it is likely that steelmaking technology 
improvements will continue so that United States imported man-
ganese requirements will decline sharply.519 Important opportunities 
also exist to increase cobalt, chromium, and platinum group metals 
supplies through recycling. In the case of platinum group metals, 
the chief opportunity for conservation is through recycling of auto-
motive catalysts. 52o Recovery of chromium and cobalt from steel-
making, industrial, and chemical waste and improved recycling tech-
niques are additional ways to reduce United States dependence on 
foreign sources of first-tier minerals. 521 Increasing conservation ef-
forts not only adds to strategic material supplies but also benefits 
513 See id. at 368-69. 
514 NEED FOR NATIONAL MATERIALS POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 4, at 44. 
515 Id. 
516Id. at 34. 
517 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 215. 
518 Id.; see also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 268-78. 
519 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 227-38. 
520 See id. at 36, 238-45. 
521 Id. at 36,245-54; see also CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 279-83; GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, INDUSTRIAL WASTES: AN UNEX-
PLORED SOURCE OF VALUABLE MINERALS (1980). 
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the environment by reducing land filling and disposal of waste. Re-
cycling is also an energy conservation measure because scrap has 
already been processed from raw ores to metal form. 522 
The federal government should undertake three steps to improve 
the prospects for strategic materials conservation. First, the federal 
government should provide update information on the recycling of 
strategic materials. Data on scrap containing strategic materials is 
incomplete. With more accurate information, the federal government 
could develop more effective programs to enhance scrap recovery. 
Congress could direct the Bureau of Mines to conduct and regularly 
update surveys of the disposal of scrap containing strategic minerals. 
Information from these surveys could be used to direct research in 
alternative materials and conservation, update the national defense 
stockpile, and identify investment opportunities for industry.523 Sec-
ond, the federal government must identify specific actions to support 
strategic materials recycling, such as structuring taxation, procure-
ment, environmental, and other policies to encourage increased re-
cycling. 524 Surplus federal property recycling, especially Department 
of Defense property surplus, provides an opportunity to conserve 
strategic materials. The Department of Defense has conducted a 
precious metals recovery program from surplus government prop-
erty.525 This program provides a precedent for a government-oper-
ated recycling program and should be expanded government-wide. 526 
Finally, the federal government must increase funding of research 
and development activities aimed at improving recycling technolo-
gies. 527 Private industry is not likely to invest in recycling technology 
research and development so long as low-priced metal from foreign 
sources is readily available. 528 
E. Increased Domestic Raw Materials Supply 
1. Increased Onshore Exploration and Development 
The highly industrialized United States economy is critically de-
pendent upon an adequate and stable supply of many materials and 
minerals. While the United States currently possesses an abundance 
522 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE u.s. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 372. 
523 Id. at 36, 372-74. 
524 Id. at 31h'37, 374-76. 
526 Id. at 376. 
526 I d. at 376. 
527 Id. at 376-78. 
528 I d. at 36. 
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of renewable and nonrenewable material resources, it has a confusing 
and contradictory minerals policy that has impeded the development 
of domestic mineral deposits. 529 The fu'st step to increase domestic 
raw material supply, therefore, is the development of an effective 
and coherent national minerals policy to encourage domestic mineral 
production. 530 
Such policy reform should achieve three results concerning the 
increased use of federal lands. First, the federal government should 
centralize all activities relating to mineral development within one 
executive body and require that land use plans and policies be de-
veloped only after a full assessment of an area's mineral resources. 
Second, the federal government should implement a mechanism for 
reevaluating lands withdrawn or restricted from mineral develop-
ment to determine whether these lands should be opened to mineral 
development to meet national security requirements. Finally, public 
lands should be more accessible for mineral exploration and devel-
opment. 531 
Of twenty-nine strategic and critical minerals, Alaska has devel-
opment potential for eighteen, including the four first-tier miner-
als. 532 Outside of Alaska, the potential for discovery of commercially 
exploitable deposits of the first-tier strategic mineral deposits in the 
United States is insufficient to generate widespread prospecting 
efforts.533 The fact that there is little possibility of discovering do-
mestic deposits of chromium, cobalt, manganese, or platinum group 
metals does not rule out the possibility that there may be significant 
undiscovered deposits. 534 Little domestic exploration for the first-
tier minerals, however, is occurring. The high cost of exploration 
529 Note, supra note 94, at 904. 
530 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 80-8l. 
531 Id. at 81; see also Note, supra note 94, at 904. 
532 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 31 
(statement of Sen. Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska). A 1978 study on the potential impact of 
the withdrawal of Alaskan federal lands pursuant to the Alaska National Interest Lands 
legislation concluded that a mining industry could develop in Alaska by the 1990s that would: 
[1] Provide ... substantial quantities of nonfuel minerals, including gold, silver, 
copper, nickel, lead, zinc, molybdenum and asbestos, valued at between $900 million 
and $1 billion annually (in 1977 dollars). 
[2] Provide ... 20,000 to 40,000 additional jobs, representing about 0.5 percent of 
current unemployment. 
[3] Reduce the ... balance of payments deficit by between $700 million and $1 
billion annually (in 1977 dollars). 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 20. For discussion on the 
potential of domestic onshore mineral exploration, see Ridgeway, Stalking Strategic Metals, 
SCI. DIGEST, Feb. 1983, at 42. 
533 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 35l. 
534 Id. 
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and the unlikelihood of locating deposits of these minerals impedes 
domestic exploration. 535 
The federal government must take several steps to increase the 
potential for discovery of domestic resources of the first-tier and 
other minerals. The government must provide economic incentives, 
principally through the tax system, to improve domestic mineral 
exploration economics. 536 United States tax laws that recognize the 
importance of the mining industry-percentage depletion allowances 
and expensing of exploration and development-must be contin-
ued. 537 Tax law reform should consider several critical changes. 
First, the investment tax credit, an important incentive to capital 
formation, should be extended to include all buildings used in mining 
and minerals processing. 538 The credit should be increased to stim-
ulate replacement of older equipment. Second, depreciation sched-
ules should be liberalized to permit faster and more realistic capital 
recovery.539 Finally, the costs of environmental and health and safety 
regulations should be deducted by the taxpayer.540 These acts would 
also promote capital formation needed to finance domestic mining 
operations. 541 
Tax incentives, however, can only improve the cost of development 
projects by a limited amount, and additional government action is 
required if strategic mineral domestic exploration is to be encour-
aged. 542 The federal government should revise antitrust laws and 
policy to promote joint ventures, pooling of money, skills, and equip-
ment by two or more companies and end the adversarial relationship 
between the government and the minerals industries. 543 Congress 
should apply cost-benefit analyses to all environmental legislation to 
ensure that the goals sought will be attainable economically without 
imposing a disproportionate burden on the minerals industry.544 In 
promulgating regulations, the administrative bodies should also bal-
ance the environmental objectives against the implementation 
cost. 545 
5:<5Id. at 32; see also id. at 351-53. 
536 [d.; see also Plotkin, supra note 296, at 203-04. 
5:<7 U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 42. 
538 Id. 
539 [d. 
540 [d. at 42; see Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 
197, at 264. 
541 See U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 82. 
542 TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY, supra note 4, at 32. 
543 See U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 82. 
544 Hearings on Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, supra note 197, at 264. 
545 [d.; U.S. MINERALS VULNERABILITY REPORT, supra note 19, at 82-83. 
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2. Deep Seabed Mining 
Deep seabed mining offers the greatest promise to reduce United 
States mineral supplies dependency on potentially unstable foreign 
sources.546 Much of the deep seabed is covered with nodules that 
contain hard minerals including nickel, copper, cobalt, and man-
ganese. 547 The United States will benefit if these hard mineral re-
sources are developed and made available for domestic use.548 Com-
mercial recovery of deep seabed mineral resources could reduce the 
nation's dependence on foreign sources of non fuel minerals549 because 
deep seabed nodules contain four minerals in commercial propor-
tions,550 all vital to United States industrial production. 551 With the 
exception of copper, the United States is heavily dependent on for-
eign sources for its supply of these metals. 552 
Manganese nodules were first discovered in 1873 on the deep 
Pacific ocean seabed during the scientific research expedition of the 
wooden steamship H.M.S. Challenger. 553 The nodules were recog-
nized then to be rich in several minerals, but they remained a sci-
entific curiosity until advanced technology and contemporary price 
increases made the commercial development of these resources pos-
sible and profitable. 554 
546 See CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 73. 
547 [d.; 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(4) (1982). 
548 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(5). 
549 [d. § 1401(a)(2)-(6). 
550 Prime nodules consist of 27% to 30% manganese, 1.1% to 1.4% nickel, 1.0% to 1.3% 
copper, and 0.2% to 0.4% cobalt. R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES 219 
(1979); see also J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 22~0 (1965). 
551 H.R. REP. No. 411, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1600, 1601. 
552 See 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)-(4) (1982). 
553 J. SULLIVAN, PACIFIC BASIN ENTERPRISE AND THE CHANGING LAW OF THE SEA 4 
(1977). 
554 [d. Nodules are rounded masses of manganese oxide that have developed through the 
gradual accretion of minerals chemically precipitated around some minute nucleus like a grain 
of sand. D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED MINERALS RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 124 (1976). They are generally earthy black in color 
and vary in size from 0.5 to 25 centimeters, averaging about 3 centimeters. [d.; J. MERO, 
supra note 550, at 129--32. The nodules either form in clusters like oversized grapes or are 
strewn one layer thick in fields resembling a mosaic of potato-shaped forms, partly embedded 
in a smooth layer of mud. R. ECKERT, supra note 550, at 215; see J. MERO, supra note 550, 
at 133, 142, 146, 156-63. 
The average growth rate for nodules is estimated to be about 0.1 millimeter every one 
thousand years. The growth has been characterized as "one of the slowest chemical reactions 
in nature, [measured in] atomic layers per day." R. ECKERT, supra note 550, at 215 (quoting 
B. HEEZEN & C. HOLLISTER, THE FACE OF THE DEEP 423 (1971». At this accretion rate, it 
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The exploration and development of deep seabed mineral deposits 
may contribute to a long-term solution to the security of supply of 
critical minerals found in manganese nodules. It has been estimated 
that the total quantity of manganese nodules lying on the Pacific 
seabed alone is 1. 7 trillion metric tons. 555 A single ocean mining site 
recovering three million tons of nodules per year could produce 
42,000 tons of nickel, 37,000 tons of copper, 4,000 tons of cobalt, and 
750,000 tons of manganese. 556 Such a mining site could supply ap-
proximately five percent of the world's nickel production, one-half 
to one percent of copper, twelve percent of cobalt, and seven percent 
of manganese production. 557 
On April 30, 1982, the United Nations adopted by a vote of 130 
to four, with seventeen abstentions, a new law of the sea treaty. 558 
The United States, however, voted against the proposed treaty 
because of the seabed mining provisions. 559 In a presidential state-
ment issued on July 9, 1982, President Reagan announced that the 
United States would not sign the treaty adopted by the conference. 
The President concluded that the proposed deep seabed mining re-
gime did not protect United States economic and security interests 
and thus would not receive the United States' support.560 The federal 
government, however, has authorized domestic firms to mine the 
deep seabed. By enacting the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources 
Act of 1980,561 Congress identified direct access to seabed resources 
as a desirable alternative source of supply to imported materials and 
authorized United States companies to mine in waters beyond na-
tional jurisdiction. 562 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Assured access to mineral resources at prices established in com-
petitive markets is an important concern to the nation. Fortunately, 
compared with most nations, the United States is rich in mineral 
resources. In recent years, however, several actions of the federal 
would take 200,000 years to replace the existing supply of nodules on the floor of the Pacific 
Ocean. J. MERO, supra note 550, at 154, 175-78. 
555 [d. at 175. 
556 [d. 
557 [d. 
558 N. Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 1. 
559 [d. 
560 [d.; Bus. WK., May 24, 1982, at 196. 
561 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
562 [d. § 1401. 
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government have reduced the profitability of domestic mineral proj-
ects, making investments in such projects less attractive than they 
otherwise would have been. In general, United States government 
actions have tended to do more to discourage and less to stimulate 
investment in domestic mineral projects through restricting the use 
of federal lands for mineral exploration, imposing strict environmen-
tal requirements, restricting the use of joint ventures to pool re-
sources, and adding to labor costs by establishing worker health and 
safety requirements. 
The decline of the United States mining and mineral-processing 
industry has resulted in lost jobs and job opportunities in the indus-
try, has adversely affected the United States balance of trade, and 
has increased concerns about the United States' vulnerability to 
mineral supply disruptions. In addition, the absence of a coherent 
government minerals policy has created much uncertainty about the 
future mineral supply availability. 
The United States relies heavily on a few countries for its supplies 
of strategic materials, the bulk of which comes from countries or 
regions that are either politically unstable or ideologically hostile to 
the United States. As a result, the United States may face disrup-
tions in the supply of these materials that could be damaging to the 
national defense and the economy of the nation. The United States 
must develop comprehensive policies to protect itself in the event 
that the supply of critical and strategic minerals are severed. 
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* The number of years that known global reserves will last with consump-
tion growing exponentially at the average annual rate of growth. 
** The platinum group metals are platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium, 
rhodium, and ruthenium. 
Source: D. Meadows, D. Meadows, J. Randers and W. Behrens, The Limits 
to Growth: A Reportfor the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of 
Mankind 56-60 (1972). 
291 
292 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:217 
Table 2. 
Increase in Known World Reserves of Selected Natural Resources* 
Resource 1950 1970 Percent 
Increase Since 1950 
Tin 6000 6600 +10% 
Manganese 500,000 635,000 +27% 
Zinc 70,000 113,000 +61% 
Lead 40,000 86,000 +115% 
Copper 100,000 279,000 +179% 
Bauxite 1,400,000 5,300,000 +279% 
Oil 75,000,000 455,000,000 +507% 
Chromite 100,000 775,000 +675% 
Iron 19,000,000 251,000,000 +1221% 
Potash 5,000,000 118,000,000 +2360% 
Phosphates 26,000,000 1,178,000,000 +4430% 
* Amounts, in thousands of metric tons, estimated to exist in known lodes reservoirs. 
Source: Simon, The Scarcity of Raw Materials: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 
Atlantic, June 1981, at 33, 34. 
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Table 3. 
United States Net Import Reliance on Selected Strategic Minerals as a Percent of 
Apparent Consumption, 1984 
Mineral Percent Major Foreign 
Source 
Bauxite and 96 Jamaica, 
Alumina** Guinea, 
Suriname 
Chromium* 82 South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, 
Soviet Union 
Cobalt* 95 Zaire, Zambia, 
Canada 
Columbium** 100 Brazil, Canada, 
Thailand 
Diamonds** 100 South Africa, 
Zaire, Britain 
Graphite** 90 Mexico, China, 
Brazil 
Manganese* 99 South Africa, 
Gabon, France 
Platinum* 91 South Africa, 
Britain, Soviet 
Union 
Rutile** 61 Australia, 
Sierra Leone, 
South Africa 
Tantalum** 94 Thailand, 
Malaysia, Brazil 
Tin** 79 Thailand, 
Malaysia, 
Indonesia 
Vanadium** 41 South Africa, 
Canada, Finland 
* Considered essential to United States defense. 
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Source: Foreign Metals-An Achilles' Heel for U.S., U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 18, 
1985, at 74. 
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Table 4. 
United States Strategic Metal Consumption by Industrial Sector, 1980 
Chromium Cobalt Manganese Platinum group 
Sector 1,000 (Percent) 1,000 (Percent) 1,000 (Percent) 1,000 (Percent) 
tons Ib tons t,r oz 
Transportation 112 (19) 7015 (41) 215 (21) 731 (33) 
Construction 123 (21) 0 (0) 375 (36) 171 (8) 
Machinery 98 (17) 3081 (18) 165 (16) 0 (0) 
Electrical 52 (9) 2530 (15) 67 (7) 526 (24) 
Refractory 44 (7) 538 (3) 0 (0) 63 (3) 
Chemical 87 (15) 3785 (22) 50 (5) 284 (13) 
Other 71 (12) 190 ~ 157 (15) 431 (20) 
Total 587 (100) 17,139 (100) 1,029 (100) 2,206 (100) 
Source: Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, Strategic Materials: Technologies 
to Reduce U.S. Import Vulnerability 62 (OTA-ITE-248) (May 1985). 
Table 5. 
Federal Land Ownership in the Western States 


























Source: Bureau of Land Management, United States Department of the Interior, Public 
Lands Statistics 1984 10 (1985). 
